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ABSTRACT 
Schools in the United States are at risk of a terrorist attack and the country is 
unprepared.  The recent history of terrorist attacks illustrates that the methodology and 
audacity of terrorists is evolving and increasing.  Terrorists no longer differentiate 
between civilians and military personnel, nor do they discriminate amid gender and age.  
While the thought of deliberately focusing an attack on children might seem 
unconventional, or even taboo, terrorism and terrorist tactics have fundamentally changed 
and terrorists are no longer fearful of taking such drastic action.   
This research indicates that we are unprepared and major improvements need to 
be made.  Until serious and significant changes are made, schools remain vulnerable, 
unprotected targets of terrorist attacks.  The consequences of inaction are enormous, 
being measured in the loss of the lives of children. While a terrorist attack cannot always 
be prevented, there are actions that schools can take to enhance the safety and security of 
staff and students.  This research culminates in specific recommendations for Maine 
School District 207 and highlights the strategic methodologies and practices that all 
schools can utilize and employ to become better prepared.  A key recommendation is the 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Schools in the United States are at risk of a terrorist attack, and the country is 
unprepared.  The recent history of terrorist attacks illustrates that the methodology and 
audacity of terrorists are evolving and increasing.  Terrorists no longer differentiate 
between civilians and military personnel, nor do they discriminate amid gender and age.  
Terrorist attacks have already transpired at, or in close proximity to, schools in the U.S. 
and abroad, and are likely to continue and escalate.   
In the period from 1968 to 2004, thirty-four separate terrorist-related incidents 
occurred in educational institutions or on vehicles transporting students to and from them.  
Five of these occurred in the United States. The most heinous terrorist attack on a school 
occurred in the small town of Beslan, near the troubled Russian republic of Chechnya in 
September of 2004.  A total of 323 hostages, including 186 children, died in the school 
terrorist siege.  Equally disturbing was the school massacre in "Netiv Meir," an 
elementary school in Ma'a lot, Israel, on May 15, 1974, the twenty-sixth anniversary of 
Israeli independence.  This attack, in which twenty-one students were killed, was 
perpetrated by Palestinian members of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine, who were dressed as Israeli soldiers. While the thought of deliberately focusing 
an attack on children might seem unconventional, or even taboo, terrorism and terrorist 
tactics have fundamentally changed, and terrorists are no longer fearful of taking such 
drastic action.   
Several recent comprehensive studies highlight the current state of readiness of 
schools in the United States.  These studies indicate that the country is unprepared and 
major improvements need to be made, especially in urban area schools.  There are five 
comprehensive reports germane to this topic.  Four of the reports are directly related to 
school preparedness for terrorist attacks.  The America Prepared Campaign studied the 
specific terrorism preparedness in America’s twenty largest school districts.  The study 
measured the performance of the school districts using the Department of Education’s 
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Practical Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide for Schools and Communities.1  This 
guide recommends the steps that all school districts should take to ensure that they are 
prepared for many different crises, including terrorism. The urban area Chicago Public 
Schools (CPS), received a failing grade.  Andres Durbak, the CPS Director of Safety and 
Security estimates that 25 to 50 percent of the city’s schools do not have satisfactory 
emergency plans, much less practice them.2  Many of the CPS schools do not have the 
basic emergency supplies that the city’s own website urges families to have at home in a 
“ready kit” despite the fact that the district’s schools are home for over 400,000 children.  
In fact, the U.S. Department of Education reports that nearly 60 million children, 20 
percent of the U.S. population, attend the nation’s 119,000+ schools.3 
Unfortunately, poor planning for terrorist attacks is germane not only to the 
Chicago Public Schools, but nationwide.  Despite some advancement, there is an 
alarming consensus that school emergency preparedness and readiness varies widely. A 
2005 national survey of School Resource Officers (SRO) illustrated the following: 92 
percent of SRO’s believe that schools are “soft targets” for potential terrorist attacks, 74 
percent of SRO’s believe that their schools are inadequately prepared to respond to a 
terrorist attack, half said that emergency plans for their schools are not adequate, and 66 
percent of SRO’s indicated that their emergency plans are not practiced on a regular or 
ongoing basis.4 
A May 17, 2007 report by the United States Government Accountability Office 
(GAO)  asserts that recent events such as school shootings and the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
                                                 
1  United States, Department of Education,  Practical Information on Crisis Planning:  A Guide for 
Schools and Communities (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, 2003), 1-9. 
http://www.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/emergencyplan/crisisplanning.pdf (Accessed January 9, 2008). 
2 Allison Phinney, Preparedness in America’s Schools:  A Comprehensive Look at Terrorism 
Preparedness in America’s Twenty Largest School Districts (American Prepared Campaign, Inc., 
September 2004), 5. http://www.workplaceviolence911.com/docs/20040916.pdf   (Accessed August 20, 
2007).  
3 United States, Secret Service and the United States, Department of Education,  The Final Report and 
Findings of the Safe School Initiative:  Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United 
States (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, 2002), 7. 
http://www.ustreas.gov/usss/ntac/ssi_final_report.pdf (Accessed January 9, 2008). 
4 National School Safety Center, NCSS Review of School Safety Research (Westlake Village, CA: 
National School Safety Center, 2006), 4.  
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have heightened awareness for the need for school districts to be prepared to address a 
range of emergencies within and outside of schools buildings. The GAO reports that only 
thirty-two states have laws or policies requiring school districts to have emergency 
management plans.  An estimated 62 percent of school districts identified challenges 
related to a lack of equipment, training for staff, and personnel with expertise in 
emergency planning.5 
Urban area schools are a higher profile target than rural schools because they have 
large student populations and are generally located in or close to major population centers 
thus allowing terrorists more opportunities for access as well as providing greater 
anonymity. This in turn can make it easier for terrorists to gather intelligence with respect 
to the target.  Until serious and significant changes are made, urban area schools remain 
vulnerable, unprotected targets for terrorist attacks.  The consequences of inaction are 
enormous, being measured in the loss of lives of children. 
Finding and allocating funding sources to implement safety and security measures 
presents significant challenges as well. Schools must compete for tax dollars in an 
environment of disgruntled citizens, continually demanding additional services while 
concurrently expecting a reduction in costs.  School districts must share tax revenue with 
other taxing bodies including the federal, state and local governments.  In this extremely 
competitive environment, it is often difficult for school districts to support existing 
programs, much less propose and fund new program areas.  Many urban school districts 
continually operate at a deficit and regularly depend upon referendums just to remain 
fiscally viable.  Most school districts will not increase budgets to enhance security 
measures, as security is not considered an essential priority.  Unfortunately, only an 
attack on a school will change this mindset. 
 
 
                                                 
5 United States. Government Accountability Office, Emergency Management: Status of School 
Districts’ Planning and Preparedness (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007), 1.   
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07821t.pdf (Accessed December 21, 2007).  
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary overarching question driving this research is: 
“Given the current security environment, what measures can be implemented to 
better protect schools in urban areas from acts of terrorism?” 
Here are several tertiary questions that will frame and direct the research: 
1. Which acts of terrorism have been perpetrated on schools in the U.S. and 
abroad?  
2. What makes children/schools an attractive target for terrorists? 
3. Which types of attacks are possible or probable? 
4. Which types of security measures are available to protect schools? 
5. Which measures can be put into place in urban-area schools to prevent, 
protect against, and minimize the effects of terrorist attacks that do occur? 
6. Can these measures be used as a model locally, regionally or at the 
national level? 
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research project utilized various facets of the Policy Options Analysis and 
Case Studies methodologies.  The Policy Options analysis defines the problem, identifies 
alternative solutions, selects criteria to judge outcomes, projects the outcome of each of 
the proposed alternative solutions and finally identifies the recommended solution(s).  
These dimensions and elements directly correlate with the established research questions.  
An examination of what types of security measures are currently available to protect 
schools lends it self to the policy options analysis. In evaluating different policies to 
protect schools, the Policy Options Analysis provided for preparedness metrics to be 
developed with which to measure the efficacy of different policies and then apply this to 
the analysis of options.   
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The Case Study method was utilized to examine three identified cases relevant to 
answering the research questions.  This research thoroughly reviews and analyzes the 
policies or programs of two large school districts (Fairfax, Virginia and Chicago, Illinois) 
and critically contrasts and compares them against the policies and programs of Park 
Ridge School District 207 based upon previous study criteria coupled with preparedness 
metrics developed by the author.  Also explored were the experiences of Russia, Israel 
and the United Kingdom in providing school protection and the lessons learned that can 
be applied to school protection in the United States. 
The general components of the research were a threat analysis, prevention and 
deterrence, preparedness, emergency response, recovery, and recommendations.  The 
threat analysis chapter examines the rationale to attack a school; the history of school 
attacks, which illustrates previous motivation and methods; current threat indicators, 
which highlight current activities occurring that suggest a possible attack; understanding 
the motivation of terrorists to attack a school and children; and finally, the types of 
potential attack methods which could be used.   
The prevention and deterrence chapter appraises intelligence gathering and fusion, 
and risk and vulnerability assessments, which includes an analysis of the unique 
vulnerabilities of children, and the vulnerability of infrastructure and the school 
transportation system.  The preparedness chapter assesses planning, organization, 
equipment, training, exercises, and developing psychological resiliency in the pre-event 
phase.  The emergency response chapter assays potential threat response, event specific 
response, and supporting psychological resiliency during the event phase.  The recovery 
chapter critically examines sustaining psychological resiliency in the post event phase 
and delves into the necessity to plan for continuity of operations after a significant event.   
This research culminates in specific homeland security recommendations for 
District 207, and strategic recommendations that possess utility for any school district.  
The analysis element of this research also contains recommendations interspersed 
throughout the aforementioned chapters as the analysis and recommendations are 
inextricably linked and therefore examined concurrently.  These recommendations are 
gleaned from the literature, school safety conferences and classes.  The final 
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recommendations are a function of the research synthesized with an analysis of the case 
studies and the author’s personal experiences in the field of homeland security. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
1. Literature  
This research will add significantly to the existing, yet nascent body of literature.  
It attempted to draw conclusions based upon various existing arguments and highlight the 
similarities as well as the differences.  It also endeavored to identify trends or patterns in 
the existing literary arguments. 
2. Future Research Efforts  
This research will benefit future research efforts by having gone beyond the 
routine investigation and recapitulation of what is already known by striving to develop 
actionable solutions to the identified problems. 
3. The Immediate Consumer   
The immediate consumer will be School District 207, which is comprised of three 
large high schools with a combined student enrollment of more than seven thousand 
students.  Local public safety agencies with accountability to respond to this district as 
part of their jurisdictional boundaries will also benefit. 
4. Practitioners and Leaders  
Ideally, the final recommendations can be utilized as a framework for school 
emergency preparedness locally, regionally and nationally. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The threat of terrorism against schools in the United States is a relatively new, but 
legitimate concern and the literature reflects that.  The literature supporting this research 
is nascent and can be appropriately categorized into the following eight sub-literatures: 
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(a) federal government documents, discussing general terrorism on a macro level; (b) 
state government documents, discussing terrorism on a micro level; (c) scholarly journal 
articles, discussing terrorism specific to children and schools; (d) trade journal, 
newspaper and magazine articles, discussing terrorism related to children and schools; (e) 
textbooks specifically examining the issue of terrorism and schools; (f) studies and 
reports evaluating the preparedness of various school districts in the United States; (g) 
related unclassified intelligence reports; (h) commercial information and; (i) conference 
materials. 
1. Federal Government Documents 
There are numerous government documents either directly or tangentially related 
to this research topic.  The literature indicates that educational institutions are often 
overlooked as a potential target.  The National Strategy for Protection of Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Assets lists eleven sectors:  water, power and energy, information 
and telecommunications, chemical industry, transportation, banking and finance, defense 
industry, postal and shipping, agriculture and food, public health and emergency services. 
The only mention of schools in the entire document is that they are a consumer of 
electricity.6 The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) list of 77,069 high-risk sites 
does not include any educational institutions, as it is assumed that local and regional 
authorities will assume responsibility for their protection.7   
The National Response Plan was signed off on by the Secretary of Education at 
the time, Rod Paige, but only mentions schools twice in the 426-page document; once on 
page 68 as it relates to defining local government, and once in the Biological Incident 
Annex as it relates to epidemiological medical surveillance and school absences.8  
                                                 
6 President of the United States, National Strategy for Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Assets (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003), 50. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/physical_strategy.pdf  (Accessed January 8, 2008). 
7  Peter K. Forster, “Beslan: Counter-terrorism Incident Command: Lessons Learned,” Homeland 
Security Affairs II, no. 3 (October 2006): 1-7. http://www.hsaj.org/?article=2.3.3 (Accessed January 15, 
2007).  
8 United States, Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, DC: DHS, 
2003), 50. 
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Similarly, the National Strategy for Homeland Security also mentions schools only twice; 
once as it relates to mentioning where Americans congregate9 and once in making the 
argument that while schools are critical to the communities they serve, they are not 
critical to the nation as a whole.10 
Alternatively, there are documents published by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Education (DOE) that convey a 
sense of exigency and acknowledge the importance of protecting schools from acts of 
terrorism.  FEMA published its “Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of 
Terrorist Attacks” in December of 2003 with the purpose of providing school 
administrators with the basic principles and techniques to make a school that is safe from 
terrorist attacks.11 
Likewise, in August 2003, FEMA published the document: Building a Disaster-
Resistant University.12 While this document recognizes the necessity to protect 
universities as well as subordinate educational facilities, it focuses on an “all-hazards” 
approach.  In fact, a hazard table in the document outlines floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, 
tornados, coastal storms, landslides and wildfires while terror attacks are not mentioned 
anywhere in the document.  It is unclear why the otherwise comprehensive document 
excludes terrorism, when universities and college campuses present many unique 
opportunities for terrorists.  Some universities engage in research that is considered 
controversial by many.  The University of California at Los Angeles is currently 
considering possible lawsuits against animal rights activists that have targeted researchers 
and their families. 
                                                 
9 United States, Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security 
(Washington, DC: DHS, 2003), 7. http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf (Accessed 
January 8, 2008). 
10 Ibid., 30. 
11 Federal Emergency Management Agency,  Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of 
Terrorist Attacks Risk Management Series FEMA 428 (Washington, DC: FEMA, 2003), 1. 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/plan/prevent/rms/428/fema428.pdf (Accessed January 8, 2008). 
12 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Building A Disaster Resistant University  FEMA 443 
(Washington, DC: FEMA, 2003), 25. http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=1565 (Accessed 
January 8, 2008). 
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Additionally, at the federal level, the U.S. Department of Education has published 
several resources for schools to utilize to better prepare for emergencies in general.  In 
response to the terrorist attack on a school in Beslan, Russia, the U.S. Department of 
Education Deputy Secretary, Eugene Hickok, issued a formal letter to all schools 
regarding the incident.  While the letter emphasized that there was no reported risk to 
U.S. educational institutions at that time, it nonetheless outlined specific protective 
measures that schools in the U.S. can take to be better prepared.13  The U.S. Department 
of Education also published its Practical Information on Crisis Planning:  A Guide for 
Schools and Communities in May 2003. While virtually absent in the previously 
mentioned documents, this is the first federal document found during this research that 
recognized the criticality of involving public safety agencies in the planning process.  
This guide contends that “crisis plans should be developed in partnership with other 
community groups, including law enforcement, fire safety officials, emergency health 
services, as well as health and mental health professionals.”14 
A May 2007 report by the United States Governmental Accountability Office 
titled Emergency Management: Status of School Districts’ Planning and Preparedness 
was created in response to Congress’ concerns regarding school preparedness and 
specifically how federal agencies provide assistance to school districts.  The document  
critically examines: (1) the roles of federal and state government in establishing 
requirements and providing resources to school districts for emergency planning, (2) 
what school districts have done to plan and prepare for emergencies, and (3) the 
challenges that school districts have experienced in planning for emergencies, and 
communicating with first responders, parents and students.15 
Finally, available federal literature also indicates that there are new technologies 
available to help protect school and the students contained therein.  The National Institute 
of Justice reports on a successful biometric system being utilized in New Jersey schools.  
                                                 
13 United States, Department of Education, Press Release from the Deputy Secretary, October 6, 2004, 
1. http://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/secletter/041006.html (Accessed January 10, 2008). 
14 US DOE,  Practical Information, 1.  
15 US GAO, Emergency Management, 1. 
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The Iris Recognition Project, also known as T-PASS (an acronym for Teacher-Parent 
Authorization Security System) identifies people using cameras that focus on 240 
separate points in their eyes.  The cameras are linked with computers to identify people 
that have been preauthorized and allows entry by automatically unlocking secure 
entryways.16 
2. State Government Documents 
The State of Illinois has been relatively active in the arena of crisis and 
contingency planning for schools and the available literature heralds that.  Public Act 
094-0600 (105 ILCS 128) - the School Safety Drill Act was signed into law August 16, 
2005.  Its purpose is to have public and private schools review their plans with first 
responders and to conduct school safety drills.17 The Act “establishes the minimum 
requirements and standards for schools to follow when conducting school safety drills 
and reviewing school emergency and crisis response plans and to encourage schools and 
first responders to work together for the safety of children.”18 Additionally, Title 29 part 
1500, Joint Rules of the Office of the State Fire Marshal and the Illinois State Board of 
Education: School Emergency and Crisis Response Plans, establishes requirements for 
the annual review and updating of the protocols and procedures that is required in each 
school’s emergency and crisis response plan required by the aforementioned School 
Safety Drill Act.19   
3. Scholarly Journal Articles 
There is a paucity of literature on this subject available in scholarly journals.  
What is available is embryonic and limited in scope.  One article, “Schools and 
                                                 
16 Jeffrey P. Cohn, “Keeping an Eye On School Security: The Iris Recognition Project in New Jersey 
Schools,” NIJ Journal no. 254 (July 2006). 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/journals/254/iris_recognition_print.html  (Accessed January 18th, 2007). 
17 Illinois State Board of Education, ISBA/OSFM All Hazard Preparedness Guide for Illinois Schools. 
(Springfield, IL: State of Illinois, 2006), 32. http://www.isbe.state.il.us/safety/default.htm (Accessed 




Terrorism,” in the Journal of School Health clearly stands apart from the other literature 
and offers a wealth of information on the subject.20  This article covers a myriad of issues 
concerning schools and terrorism.  The author argues that schools are vulnerable to 
terrorism for several reasons.  Schools are obviously places where large numbers of 
children gather on a daily basis.  Every day, 53 million children attend more than 119,000 
public and private schools.  Schools are essentially “in loco parentis,” which translates 
“in the place of the parent,” hence school officials have a special responsibility for the 
students’ care.21  The author also contends that while many national preparedness 
activities are underway, there is no coordination between the various activities. 
Collaboration between education, public health, and emergency responders at the state 
and local level is key.22 
Another informative scholarly journal article is “Terrorist Attacks Against 
Children: Vulnerabilities, Management Principles and Capability Gaps,” by Mark 
Brandenburg and James Regens.23  While the authors wrote the article from a healthcare 
perspective, the article contains a wealth of interconnected information. The authors 
contend that the risk of children being targeted by terrorists is evidenced by the fact that 
children who have been placed in danger, injured or killed generate an enormous 
emotional impact on the community and in the media.  They cite not only the attack in 
Beslan, but also point out that the attackers on the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma 
City killed nineteen children in the attack.  They highlight that “experts think it is 
plausible that schools, daycare centers, and other locations where children congregate in 
the U.S. are just as vulnerable to terrorism (as Beslan).”24  The authors also demonstrate 
many reasons why children are more vulnerable and susceptible to terrorist attacks than 
adults, citing emotional differences, dependency on guardians for safety and emotional 
                                                 
20  “Schools and Terrorism,” 39-51. 
21 Ibid., 41. 
22 Ibid., 43. 
23 Mark Brandenburg and James Regens, “Terrorist Attacks Against Children: Vulnerabilities, 
Management Principles and Capability Gaps,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 
3, no. 4 (2006): 1-17. 
24 Brandenburg and Regens, “Terrorist Attacks Against Children,” 1. 
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needs, and the need for a guardian to find basic resources.25  The article also covers the 
uniqueness of pediatric anatomy and physiology and their effect on surviving terrorist 
attacks.  The greater relative body surface area of children places them at great risk for 
more rapid skin absorption of chemical agents or toxins.26 The skin of very young 
children is also less able to heal after injury from vesicant exposure.27 
A critical position in protecting schools against terrorism is that of the school 
nurse.  In “Bioterrorism Knowledge and Emergency Preparedness Among School 
Nurses,” the authors claim that the 47,000 nurses in U.S. schools provide the resources 
that bridge the gap between schools, students, families and the healthcare community and 
that contrary to hospitals and other facilities, schools have a small number of people 
present with medical training.28  The authors point out that school nurses are critical due 
to a lack of basic medical training by other school staff.  A study of teachers in Missouri, 
Arkansas and Kansas revealed that one third had not received training in first aid, and 40 
percent had not received training in cardiopulmonary resuscitation.  The data indicated 
that public school teachers “lack the adequate emergency care knowledge and skills” due 
to a lack of training and incentives for training.29  This revelation, coupled with the fact 
that schools are essentially “in loco parentis,” and that school officials have a special 
responsibility for the students’ care is especially troubling.  There seems to be a gap in 
the public’s expectation of teachers and the emergency care they can actually provide in 
times of crisis.   
On balance, Feldman highlights the bravery displayed by teachers in New York 
immediately in the aftermath of 9/11.  She stated:  
Within minutes, the children were plunged into darkness, breathing air 
thick with smoke and fear.  But every single child escaped and was safely  
 
                                                 
25 Brandenburg and Regens, “Terrorist Attacks Against Children,” 3. 
26 Ibid., 4. 
27 Ibid., 11. 
28  Sara Evers and Laura Puzniak, “Bioterrorism Knowledge and Emergency Preparedness Among 
School Nurses,” Journal of School Health 75, no. 6 (August 2005): 232-237. 
29 Ibid., 232. 
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delivered to grateful parents; not one was lost.  What saved them?  The 
courageous and clear-headed actions of their teachers, principals, and 
other school staff.30 
Conversely, Feldman also acknowledges that the teachers, principles and other 
staff had no preparation for dealing with this magnitude and that they reacted based on 
the instinct to protect the children and partly what they knew as educators.31 
What this literature seems to indicate is that experts agree that schools are at risk 
for terrorism and children are especially vulnerable.  They also appear to agree that there 
are gaps between education, public health, and emergency responders at the state and 
local level and there is a lack of emergency preparedness training among teachers and 
school staff.  The question unanswered by this literature is “why do these gaps exist and 
how can they be closed?”   
4. Trade Journals, Newspaper, Magazine and Internet-Based Articles 
This sub-literature accounts for a significant amount of the total literature 
available specific to this topic.  The Homeland Defense Journal provides a wealth of 
information written by subject matter experts.  As with previously discussed literature, 
Philpott in the Homeland Security Journal makes a strong argument that schools are 
considered viable terrorist targets for several reasons.  Among several other things, an 
attack on schools would instill nationwide panic, promote the power and reputation of a 
terrorist group, and warrant national media coverage.32  Abdullaev concurs with Perkins 
regarding schools being viable terrorist targets.  In discussing the Beslan incident, he 
avows that the choice of targeting vulnerable children appealed to the public 
consciousness and was likely the “biggest lever in the gunmen’s power play.”33 He also 
points out that rescued hostages reported that the attackers had originally planned on 
                                                 
30  Sandra Feldman, “Survival Lessons,” National Journal 33, no. 41 (October 2001): 3139. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Don Philpott, “Protecting the Nation’s Schools: Dealing with the Threat of Violence and 
Terrorism,” Homeland Defense Journal (August 2005): 14-18. 
33 Nabi Abdullev, “Beslan, Russia: Terror in the Schoolhouse” Homeland Defense Journal 2, no. 8 
(September 2004): 28-35. 
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seizing a nearby orphanage, but there were only 150 children, so they decided instead 
upon the school with more than 1,000 children.34 Ronald Stephens, executive director of 
the National School Safety Center, which was established by the U.S. Departments of 
Education and Justice, stated “No greater challenge exists today than creating safe 
schools or restoring schools to tranquil and safe places of learning; the challenge requires 
a major strategic commitment and involves placing school safety at the top of the 
educational agenda.”35  Philpott also recognizes the need for controlling school access 
and emphasizes the criticality of establishing a close working partnership with emergency 
responders and to know the extent of services offered.36  He also argues that 
comprehensive training of school personnel and maintaining provisions such as food, 
water, alternative power sources, and medical and first aid supplies are vital to self-
sustainment during an emergency.37 
Perkins echoes and builds upon Philpott’s sentiments, arguing that complacency 
is the number one threat that schools face and quotes the “it will never happen here” 
mantra so often heard prior to 9/11.  He concurs with the previous literature with respect 
to involving local first responders, but also asserts that emergency plans must be 
exercised and that crisis plans cannot be static; they must be fluid and reassessed based 
on current extenuating circumstances.38 
Bannan discusses the attractiveness of colleges and universities as potential 
terrorist targets.  She aptly points out that many universities do research with 
controversial issues such as stem cell research and weapons of mass destruction.  She 
also highlights other unique attributes of college campuses such as the size, diversity of 
students and the transient nature of the population.  Funding is also a critical issue with 
protecting campuses.  Ready Campus, a joint program of Pennsylvania’s colleges and 
universities to provide emergency preparedness resources, saw its funding from the 
                                                 
34 Abdullev, “Beslan, Russia,” 32. 
35  Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 16. 
37 Ibid., 18. 
38 Jimmie Perkins, “School Security: How Will You Know You Are Ready?” Homeland Defense 
Journal 4, no. 10 (2006): 62.  
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Department of Homeland Security end on June 30, 2006, even though there had been 
substantial interest in expanding the program to other states.39 
Dr. Robert Gillio, founder of Innerlink, an innovative developer of safety and 
health technology solutions for schools, warns that,  
A generic school response plan can almost be as worthless as no plan at 
all.  It is necessary to create a plan specifically designed for your school- 
one that takes into consideration the unique needs and threats of each and 
every school’s environment.”40  
Dr. Gillio also argues that “Administrators absolutely must design their crisis response 
plan with input from local law enforcement, first responders, parents, community 
members, and any other local stakeholders who will be affected should a crisis occur.”41 
As evidenced in other sub-literature categories, technology is increasingly 
becoming a solution to many security concerns involving schools.  The Spring 
Independent School District, in suburban Houston is currently using radio frequency 
identifier tags to track its 16,000 students as they board the school bus, enter and leave 
the school building.  Nearly 1,000 cameras monitor them every day.  Additionally, 
visitors must have their driver’s licenses scanned and identity compared to a database 
before they are permitted entry into the building.42  Conversely, Kenneth Trump, the 
President of National School and Safety Security Services of Cleveland, stated “You can 
have a million dollars of security equipment, but if you don’t have the human awareness 




                                                 
39 Anne Louise Bannon, “Big Plan On Campus,” Homeland Protection Professional 5, no. 8 
(September 2006): 34-38. 
40 Perkins, “School Security,” 62. 
41 Ibid.  
42 Greg Toppo, “High-Tech School Security is on the Rise,” USA Today (October 10, 2006),1. 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2006-10-09-school-security_x.htm (Accessed January 15, 2007). 
43 Claire Luna, “The Region; Plan For Crises, Educators Told,” Los Angeles Times (April 14, 2003), 1. 
http://proquest.umi.com (Accessed January 15, 2007). 
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recommends sharing blueprints of school buildings to local public safety agencies and 
allowing them to train on campus on weekends so they can become more familiar with 
the layout.44 
5. Textbooks 
Only two books were located that are specific to the topic of schools and 
terrorism, Innocent Targets: When Terrorism Comes to School by Michael Dorn and 
Chris Dorn, and Terror at Beslan: A Russian Tragedy with Lessons for America’s 
Schools by John Giduck.  Innocent Targets critically examines the subject of terror 
attacks on schools starting in the late 1960s including the massacre in Ma’a lot through 
the Beslan tragedy.   
Michael Dorn is considered one of the few experts in the United States with 
experience in government departments tasked with focusing on both school safety and 
terrorism.  The authors explore some of the reasons that terrorists have attacked schools 
and make recommendations that schools and their community partners can implement to 
more effectively prepare for, respond to and recover from acts of terrorism.45   
Terror at Beslan is the definitive study on the Beslan tragedy.  John Giduck has 
both a military and academic background, with a Master’s degree in Russian Studies and 
International Affairs from the University of Colorado.  Giduck traveled to Beslan days 
after the attack and conducted in depth (albeit anonymous) interviews of several Russian 
Special Forces, or Spetsnaz, forces that stormed the school and neutralized the terrorists.  
Terror at Beslan critically examines the rescue operations at the school, exposes what 
went wrong and what could have done better.  This introspective analysis culminates in 
comprehensive recommendations that can and should be employed in the United States to 
better protect our schools and our children.  John Giduck also explores the current threat 
to schools in the United States. 
                                                 
44 Claire Luna, “The Region; Plan For Crises, Educators Told,” Los Angeles Times (April 14, 2003), 1. 
http://proquest.umi.com (Accessed January 15, 2007). 2. 
45  Michael Dorn and Chris Dorn, Innocent Targets: When Terrorism Comes to School (Macon, GA: 
Safe Havens International, 2005), 140.  
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6. Studies and Reports 
There are five comprehensive reports germane to this topic.  Four of the reports 
are directly related to school preparedness for terrorist attacks.  The America Prepared 
Campaign studied the specific terrorism preparedness in America’s twenty largest school 
districts.  The introduction of the report lays the framework via its statement: 
Terrorism preparedness in schools has much less to do with citizens 
voluntarily taking responsibility for themselves and their children than it 
has to do with the government- in this case, our local government and their 
school systems- doing its job.  During the day, governments- accountable 
public officials- are responsible for the safety of our children.  Their work 
is not voluntary.46  
While the study itself was successful, some of the results were very disturbing.  
The study measured the performance of the school districts using the Department of 
Education’s Practical Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide for Schools and 
Communities.47  This guide recommends the steps that all school districts should take to 
ensure that they are prepared for many different crises including terrorism.  The best-
prepared school district in the country was the Fairfax County Public Schools.  This 
district has a comprehensive emergency management plan that deals directly with 
terrorist attacks.  It is likely that the proximity of the school district to the National 
Capital Region lends itself to this success. 
On the other end of the spectrum is the Chicago Public Schools (CPS), which 
received a failing grade.  Andres Durbak, the CPS Director of Safety and Security 
estimates that 25 to 50  percent of the city’s schools do not have satisfactory emergency 
plans, much less practice them.48  Many of the CPS schools do not have the basic 
emergency supplies that the city’s own website urges families to have at home in a 
“ready kit” despite the fact that the district’s schools are home for over 400,000 children.  
                                                 
46 Phinney, Preparedness in America’s Schools, 4. 
47 US, DOE,  Practical Information on Crisis Planning, 1-9.  
48 Phinney, Preparedness in America’s Schools, 5. 
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In fact, the U.S. Department of Education reports that nearly 60 million children, 20 
percent of the U.S. population, attend the nation’s 119,000+ schools.49 
Unfortunately, poor planning for terrorist attacks is germane not only to the 
Chicago Public Schools, but nationwide.  Despite some advancement, there is an 
alarming consensus that school emergency preparedness and readiness varies widely. A 
2005 national survey of School Resource Officers (SRO) illustrated the following: 92 
percent of SRO’s believe that schools are “soft targets” for potential terrorist attacks, 74 
percent of SRO’s believe that their schools are inadequately prepared to respond to a 
terrorist attack, half said that emergency plans for their schools are not adequate, and 66 
percent of SRO’s indicated that their emergency plans are not practiced on a regular or 
ongoing basis.50 
The document, School Safety in the 21st Century: Adapting to New Security 
Challenges Post 9/11 focuses on operational strategy and tactics.  An “all hazards” 
approach is utilized.  The document asserts that preparedness planning, training, and 
collaboration between schools (staff, faculty, students, parents), public safety agencies 
(police, fire, and emergency medical), and government emergency management 
authorities can mitigate the impact of emergencies, improve response, and accelerate 
recovery. The document closely evaluates school accountability, emergency plans, crisis 
management teams, the role of the parent, safety assessments and exercises.51 
7. Intelligence Reports  
Although not abundant in availability, there are unclassified For Official Use 
Only (FOUO) intelligence reports on this topic.  In the Department of Justice United 
States Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Indiana Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council 
newsletter, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) reported that a computer disk 
                                                 
49 US Secret Service and DOE,  The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative, 7. 
50 National School Safety Center,  NCSS Review of School Safety Research, 4. 
51 School Safety in the 21st Century:  Adapting to New Security Challenges Post-9/11,  Report of the 
Conference ‘Schools: Prudent Preparation for a Catastrophic Terrorism Incident’, October 30-31, 2003, the 
George Washington University, Washington, DC (Chicago, IL: National Strategy Forum, 2004), 4. 
http://www.nihap.org/pdf/school_safety_post_911.pdf (Accessed May 15, 2007). 
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found in Iraq included diagrams and photographs of American schools in six states 
including two in New Jersey.52  There is probably a plethora of similar information 
available via classified documents, but the author does not have a security clearance, and 
subsequently has no access to this information. 
8. Commercial Information 
There are also commercial agencies that offer planning and preparedness 
programs and implementation strategies.  The Rapid Responder Crisis Management 
System© has been awarded the Department of Homeland Security’s Safety Act 
Certification Award and the Focus on Innovation Award from the National Homeland 
Defense Foundation. Rapid Responder is a crisis management planning system developed 
by Prepared Response®, headquartered in Seattle, Washington.  This system allows 
facility personnel, police and fire units access to hundreds of site-specific data points, 
including pre-established tactical plans, floor plans, satellite images, interior and exterior 
photos, staging areas, hazardous materials locations, utility shut-offs, and evacuation 
routes for virtually any facility.  During a 2003 event at a high school in Spokane, 
Washington, this system facilitated local emergency responders in containing an armed 
student within 12 minutes.  Within 20 minutes, more than 2,000 students were safely and 
efficiently evacuated. A system such as this can also serve as prevention through 
deterring terrorists looking for an “easy mark.”  This innovative system is currently being 
installed in 1,275 middle and elementary schools in the states of Washington, Arizona, 
California, Missouri, Idaho, North and South Carolina.53 
Jane’s published the Jane’s School Safety Handbook which provides guidelines 
for crisis planning, warning signs, crisis response guidelines and crisis recovery.  The 
guide also contains helpful reference information such as sample public information 
release letters and case studies.  Although the guide is a small, spiral bound, tabbed “easy 
                                                 
52 Department of Justice, United States Attorney’s Office, Antiterrorism Advisory Council Newsletter 
10, no. 02 (October 13, 2004): 3. http://www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/anti-terrorism-advisory-
council/atac-vol-10-02.pdf (Accessed January 8, 2008). 
53 Prepared Response, Inc. “Rapid Responder Crisis Management System Helps Officials Avert 
School Tragedy,” http://www.preparedresponse.com/  (Accessed November 20, 2006).  
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reference” manual, and not a comprehensive research document, it is nonetheless a 
helpful guide for school administrators to use as a reference guide.  
9. Conference Materials 
The author attended the Illinois State Board of Education sponsored 2007 School 
Safety Conference in Mount Prospect, Illinois on November 8, 2007.  Speakers included 
Ron Ellis from the Illinois State Police, Ryan Moore from the United States Secret 
Service, Judith Coughenour from the Federal Bureau of Investigations, Martha Meegen, 
the Director of Campus Safety and Security at Columbia College, and Larry Drish from 
the Cook County Bomb Squad.  All of the speakers strongly articulated the current threat 
of terrorist attacks at educational facilities.  An abundance of helpful resources and 
material was distributed to assist schools in establishing emergency preparedness plans 
and hardening their physical facilities. 
The author also acquired materials from the NYPD Shield School Security 
Conference held in New York on September 19th, 2007.  The materials indicate that 
schools are a very soft target and include examples of recent suspicious activities leading 
authorities to believe that schools are being targeted.  These activities include a 
discussion of training films of school takedowns in terrorist training camps in 
Afghanistan and the discovery of school floor plans on a laptop confiscated from a 
known Al Qaeda operative.  The conference materials also include examples of threats 
and possible responses as well as important information on how to manage schools under 
the threat of terrorism.  
10. Conclusion 
The available literature, regardless of type or category listed above, seems to 
agree on several points.   
1. Schools are attractive targets for terrorists for several compelling reasons. 
2. Children are especially vulnerable to acts of terrorism and require strong 
guardianship. 
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3. Schools are largely considered “in loco parentis,” hence school officials 
have a special responsibility for the students’ care. 
4. There is a wealth of available crisis planning materials and training 
available specific to schools. 
5. There is new technology available and information on intelligent building 
design to better protect school facilities from unauthorized entry and 
attacks. 
6. Schools need to actively engage state and local public safety agencies in 
the planning process of developing crisis plans. 
7. Crisis plans must be exercised with local public safety agencies and 
should be re-evaluated as necessary. 
8. Schools need to provide adequate supplies (i.e., food, water, medical 
supplies) to sustain a facility during a protracted incident. 
9. Financial resources are limited and schools need funding to adopt and 
implement necessary emergency planning initiatives. 
Conversely, the literature also seems to agree that schools are not taking 
advantage of these opportunities and are not actively engaging state and local public 
safety agencies in the planning process.  They are not providing adequate training to their 
employees in areas such as basic first aid, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and specific 
actions of what to do during an emergency.  Additionally they are not providing adequate 
emergency supplies (medical supplies, food, water, etc) in their facilities to sustain staff 
and students in the event of a major incident.  The literature does not provide an 
explanation as to why this is occurring. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 This chapter set forth the problem statement, research questions, research 
methodology, significance of research, and a literature review.  The answers to the 
research questions based on the literature review are as follows: 
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1. Which acts of terrorism have been perpetrated on schools in the U.S. and 
abroad?  
The literature clearly delineates the acts of terrorism that have occurred in or in 
close proximity to schools in the United States as well as abroad.  This is expanded on in 
greater detail in Chapter II, Section B. 
2. What makes children/schools an attractive target for terrorists? 
Children are uniquely vulnerable to attacks as they are physically 
underdeveloped, passive and controllable.  Children and schools are also an attractive 
target from a psychological perspective.  Modern day media coverage would exacerbate 
and compound the overall psychological effect. 
3. Which types of attacks are possible or probable? 
A plethora of various attacks are possible.  It is most likely that conventional 
weapons would be used in an attack based on many factors further described in Chapter 
II, Section E. 
4. Which types of security measures are available to protect schools? 
There are many different security measures that can be put into place to improve 
and enhance the safety and security of students and staff.  These are discussed in detail in 
Chapter II- Prevention and Deterrence.  
5. Which measures can be put into place in urban-area schools to prevent, 
protect against, and minimize the effects of terrorist attacks that do occur? 
There are many different security measures that can be put into place to improve 
and enhance the safety and security of students and staff.  These are discussed in detail in 
Chapter II- Prevention and Deterrence.  




These measures can be used in any school, but must be developed in concert with 
local response agencies and regularly trained on and evaluated to be effective. 
The first step in protecting schools is to analyze and understand the threat.  The 
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II. THREAT ANALYSIS 
A. WHY ATTACK A SCHOOL?  
The most obvious element of terrorism is the element of intent.  The primary 
purpose of terrorism is the widespread infliction of psychological pain.54  Terrorism is 
intended to provoke collective fear and uncertainty.  This fear can spread quickly and is 
not limited to those directly involved in an attack.  Many others are affected, including 
family members and those viewing the event through media broadcast images.  
Psychological suffering is more prevalent than physical injuries resulting from a terrorist 
attack.55  Rachel Yehuda and Steven E. Hyman state that the ultimate goal of terrorists is 
psychological: to create a climate of fear, uncertainty and vulnerability.  They argue that 
the psychological effects of terrorism are central to the political goals of the 
perpetrators.56 Terrorism will not only increase in the coming years, but become more 
deadly.57  Douglas Paton and John M. Violanti purport that the United States sees itself 
as challenged and the assumptions that had previously enabled it to function normally can 
no longer be relied on as guides for behavior.  Americans must explore “a new way of 
being.”58  Yehuda, et al state: 
Terrorism is not only about life threat to individuals or even a small group 
of people but is also designed to instill fear in society at large.  Terrorism 
can threaten the sense and safety of security of everyone in the society 
attacked because they are aware that terrorists may strike again in 
unpredictable locations.  
                                                 
54 Adrienne Butler, Allison Panzer and Lewis Goldfrank, Preparing for the Psychological 
Consequences of Terrorism (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 2003), 99. 
55 Ibid., 34. 
56 Rachel Yehuda and Steven E. Hyman, “The Impact of Terrorism on Brain, and Behavior:  What We 
Know and What We Need to Know,” Neuropsychopharmacology 30, no. 10 (October 2005): 1778. 
57 Douglas Paton and John M. Violanti, “Terrorism Stress Risk Assessment and Management,” in 
Psychology of Terrorism, ed. Bruce Bongar, Lisa Brown, Larry Beutler, James Breckenridge and Philip 
Zimbardo (New York: Oxford Press, 2007), 241.   
58 Ibid., 228. 
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The attacks on 9/11 killed 3,063 people.  Although there were multiple attacks, 
the same method was used.  Susan Brandon and Andrew Silke assert that for a 
subsequent attack to significantly increase public perceptions of vulnerability, fear, and 
stress, it will have to be of larger intensity of those on 9/11 or a series of small attacks, 
such as the bombing of a shopping mall, hospital, or school.  They argue that this could 
be as or more effective than a single large-scale attack.  Most schools have little to no 
protection and are therefore an attractive target as they are a point where people are most 
vulnerable and represent a target of opportunity.59 
Mark Brandenburg and James Regens state that the risk that children might be 
targeted by terrorists is evidenced by the fact that children who have been placed in 
danger, injured or killed create an enormous emotional impact on the community and in 
the media.60  Butler, et al claim that terrorist attacks and the threat of a terrorism event 
can result in more severe psychological consequences than other types of traumatic 
events due to a perceived lack of control.  People are more likely to feel that an activity 
or event is not dangerous if they can control it.61  A large percentage of families in the 
United States sustain themselves financially through dual incomes via both spouses 
working part or full time jobs.  Of these families, many have one or more children in the 
educational system at varying levels and depend on schools to be day care providers, or 
“in loco parentis”.   
It is likely that a large-scale coordinated attack in schools in multiple locations 
would cause many families to take their children out of school and employ home 
schooling or other alternatives to traditional classroom methods due to a perceived lack 
of control.  While removing children from the activity or event (school in this case) 
would control their exposure to the danger, this would also result in the loss of school as 
a “day care” provider and would require one of the parents to remain home as a full time  
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caregiver.  The resulting disruption would have a direct impact on society as a whole vis-
à-vis a significant reduction in the workforce and subsequent tremendous impact on the 
overall economy.   
School officials in Oklahoma City reported a 25 percent decrease in attendance in 
the weeks following the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal building.  Students and 
parents were concerned about safety and wanted assurances of improved protective 
measures.  Teachers and school administrators were also concerned about possible 
attacks and the safety of students and staff.  As a result of the serial sniper attacks in 
Washington D.C. in October 2002, school attendance plummeted to as low as 10 percent 
in several elementary schools where one of the shootings occurred.  This particular 
incident involved the shooting of a child walking from a car into a school.  Similarly, the 
choice of thousands of people not to utilize air travel after 9/11 allowed a measure of 
personal control, but had devastating effects on the economy.  Paradoxically, this action 
also caused a significant increase in traffic fatalities as more people opted to drive to their 
destinations. 
B. HISTORY OF SCHOOL ATTACKS 
Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, while speaking at 
a Securing the Schools Initiative event on October 30, 2007, stated that during the 16-
year period from January 1990 to September 2006, there were 949 incidents of deliberate 
attacks on educational systems worldwide outside of the United States.  He further stated 
that these incidents resulted in 813 deaths and 2,257 injuries.62 
The trend graph developed by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of 
Terrorism graphically illustrates terrorist attacks against educational institutions from 
1998-2006.63 
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Figure 1.   MIPT History of Terrorist Attacks Illustration 
 
Brandenberg and Regens argue that that events such as the Murrah Federal 
Building bombing on  April 19, 1995, clearly demonstrates that terrorists are willing and 
able to specifically seek out and attack large numbers of children as the attackers were 
well aware that the building house a children’s day care facility.  Of 168 total deaths, 17 
were children.64 
C. CURRENT THREAT INDICATORS 
Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, while speaking at 
a Securing the Schools Initiative event on October 30, 2007, noted that when we consider 
the issue of school safety, we live in a world where — both overseas and domestically — 
we have to be concerned about the possibility of people carrying out acts of violence in 
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our schools, including those driven by terrorist motivations.65  Former FBI Special Agent 
Don Clark led the investigation into the first World Trade Center attack.  He argues that 
law enforcement and political leaders cannot leave it up to others to make sure that we 
are ready and emphasizes that refusing to believe that schools are a terrorist target does 
not make it so.66   
Brad Thor, a member of the government’s analytic “red cell” unit formed after 
9/11 believes that terrorists are currently targeting soft targets such as schools.  Thor 
theorizes that an attack will come in the form of a coordinated attack across the country 
in multiple locations.67  The Department of Justice Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council 
issued a newsletter on October 13, 2004, that warned U.S. schools to be on alert after a 
computer disk was found in an insurgent safe house Iraq that included diagrams and 
photographs of American schools.  The disk had photographs of schools in six states, 
including two in New Jersey.68  Other events demonstrating the threat to schools include: 
1. Spokesman Suleiman Abu Gheith’s declaration of al-Qaeda’s right to kill 
two million American children. 
2. An Iraqi national with known terrorist connections caught with a computer 
disk detailing Department of Education security measures and crisis 
planning for U.S. school districts. 
3. A March 16, 2007 FBI Intelligence Bulletin No. 245 warning of an 
unusual increase in the number of foreign nationals seeking school bus 
driver positions that have had connections with known terrorist groups. 
4. In 2006, two Saudi men wearing trench coats despite the summer heat, 
boarded a school bus in Tampa, Florida.  They spoke in Arabic and 
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remained for the entire ride to the school. Some security consultants 
believe that they were testing the possibility of how easy it would be to 
attack a school bus in the United States.69   
5. In the few months of early 2007, seventeen full-sized yellow school buses 
were reported stolen from charter schools, businesses schools and private 
bus companies in Houston, Texas.  Additionally, in 2005, more than 2,000 
school bus radios were stolen in California.70   
6. A videotape found in an al-Qaeda training camp in Pakistan where they 
trained for a school attack with multiple role players in a mock American 
school.71 
7. Osama bin Laden’s statement that the 2004 terrorist attack at Beslan will 
happen many times over in the United States.72 
D. UNDERSTANDING THE ATTACKERS—THE MIND OF A TERRORIST 
Is a human being capable of purposefully targeting and killing children vis-à-vis  
a terrorist attack on a school?  Clearly, the answer is yes, as evidenced by the attacks in 
Ma'a-lot and Beslan.  But what makes a person capable of committing such a heinous act, 
and perhaps more importantly, why?  To better protect schools and our children, it is 
imperative that we fully comprehend the nature of the emerging threat we face.  Jeff 
Victoroff asserts that the fast-evolving trends of globalization, religious fundamentalism 
and privatization of weapons of mass destruction together constitute a clear and present 
danger to the security of civilization.73  Victoroff also argues that political psychology 
theory advises that the better a target group understands the terrorist mindset, the better 
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that group may develop policies to manage the risk.74  An embryonic, but burgeoning 
body of research by psychologists offers an insight into the threat and the mind of the 
terrorist. 
Contrary to popular belief, terrorists are not crazed psychopaths.  Eerily enough, 
many of them are perfectly normal functioning members of society.  Victoroff cites 
several empirical psychological studies that suggest that terrorists do not usually exhibit 
psychiatric disorders.75  Phil Zimbardo purports that we are not born with tendencies 
towards good or evil but with mental templates to do either.76  Arie Kruglanski and Shire 
Fishman agree that terrorists do not seem to be characterized by a unique set of 
psychological traits or pathologies.  In fact, they state the following regarding a study: 
The terrorists did not differ from the comparison group of non-terrorists in 
any way; in particular, the terrorists did not show higher rates of any kind 
of psychopathology…..indeed terrorism would be a trivial problem if only 
those with some kind of psychopathology could be terrorists.  Rather we 
have to face the fact that normal people can be terrorists.77 
So then, if terrorists can be psychologically “normal”, how are they able to 
commit such heinous acts?  Zimbardo claims that few people will engage in an “end 
game” final solution without first being prepared psychologically to do the “unthinkable.”  
He references Bandura’s model which outlines how it is possible to morally disengage 
from destructive conduct by altering perceptions of reprehensible conduct, minimizing 
the consequences, displacing responsibility, and most significantly, by dehumanizing the 
victim.78  Thus, cognitive conditioning can be effectively used to dehumanize the enemy 
in the attacker’s eyes.  Indeed, mental conditioning is a soldier’s most potent weapon, for 
without it, it is unlikely he could kill another person.   
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An experiment by Bandura, Underwood and Fromson in 1975, revealed that 
college students would shock other college students that were dehumanized by being 
labeled “animals” more frequently than the control group.  For Islamic radicals, 
“animals” is synonymous with “infidels.”  Either term effectively dehumanizes the 
intended victim.  Zimbardo discusses the “invention of an evil enemy” that is portrayed 
as “aggressive, faceless, a rapist, godless, barbarian, a dehumanized animal, etc.79  This 
portrayal dehumanizes the intended victim and desensitizes the attacker.  History is 
replete with examples of this tactic such as during the Holocaust. This conditioning 
process can be started very early as evidenced by the indoctrination of German children 
in the 1930s and 1940s to hate Jews.  Zimbardo argues that evil was spread through a 
perverted educational system that turned away from critical thinking that would open 
student’s minds to new ideas and toward thinking about those targeted as the enemy of 
the people.80  A correlation can be drawn between these schools of seventy years ago to 
the religious Madrassa schools spreading throughout the world today. Many of the 
Maddrassas also preach hatred of Jews.   
Zimbardo questions if terrorists are programmed to carry out their deplorable 
deeds by means of some identifiable and replicable training practice.81  Unfortunately, in 
the case of Al Qaeda, the answer is yes. Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda use 
conditioning tactics to mentally prepare their attackers to kill children.  A recently 
released video clip obtained from a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan shows terrorists 
training for a school takeover operation.  Among other things, you can hear the loud 
sound of a baby crying in the background. Sources state that these sounds were piped into 
the building to create the same chaotic atmosphere that there would be in a school siege 
situation.82  This video represents a replicable training practice designed to tactically and 
psychologically prepare terrorists for an attack on a school. 
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It has been established that people are indeed capable of attacking a school and 
killing children.  The issue of how they psychologically prepare themselves to do so has 
also been addressed.  Perhaps the most salient unanswered question is “what motivates 
them to commit such despicable and deplorable acts?”  Again, psychological research 
may hold the key to this question.  The easy answer is that radical Muslims hate the 
West.  The more complex answer lies in the religious underpinnings of Islam, or more 
appropriately, the perversion of Islamic faith through radicalization.  Suicide bombers 
epitomize the deep seated commitment of radical fundamentalists.  Americans dismiss 
suicide bombers as senseless fanatics, but they view themselves as martyrs for a cause.  
Their supporters also view them the same way and honor them as heroes.  There have 
been more than ninety-five suicide bombings against Israelis since September of 2000.  
The bombers have historically been young men, but now women have joined the ranks.83  
Indeed, two of the attackers at Beslan were female Chechen Black Widow suicide 
bombers.   
Zimbardo aptly points out that suicide bomber recruits believe that they will earn 
a place beside Allah and their relatives will also be entitled to a high place in heaven 
because of their martyrdom.  Moreover, a sizable financial incentive is bestowed on their 
family as a gift for their sacrifice.  For the young males, there is an additional incentive of 
being bestowed scores of virgins in the next life.  This program of indoctrination 
encourages individuals to become living martyrs.84  The Arab press emphasizes “if 
martyrs had nothing to lose, sacrifice would be senseless.  He who commits suicide kills 
himself for his own benefit; he who commits martyrdom sacrifices himself for the sake of 
his religion and nation- the Mujahed is full of hope.”85  It is important to point out that 
the willingness to attack schools is not limited to Muslim radicals eager to commit 
martyrdom as the attack in Ma’a lot involved Palestinian Marxists and not radical 
Islamists.86 
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E. TYPES OF POTENTIAL ATTACKS 
Terrorists may elect to employ any number of methods of attack.  Typically, they 
look for a high “return on investment”- meaning that they hope to kill as many people as 
possible and create a tremendous amount of fear with minimal investments in both 
funding and time commitments.  The larger the amount of funding required, the greater 
chance of the plot being discovered by authorities investigating various funding 
mechanisms.  Likewise, the longer the amount of planning, the greater the chance of the 
planned attack, or components thereof being discovered.  While a myriad of different 
attack scenarios exist, an attack may come in six basic forms such as chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive or as conventional as weaponry such as 
firearms.   
A chemical attack could easily be achieved using readily available materials such 
as chlorine gas, either from a stolen chlorine gas compressed cylinder truck, a detonation 
of a railway cylinder adjacent to a building, or even from the school’s own chlorine 
storage for pool maintenance.  A variety of chemical agents could be easily be introduced 
into the school’s HVAC system from an outside intake.  Depending on the agent used, a 
chemical attack such as this would be undetectable and the results almost immediate.  
Not knowing where the agent was emanating from would also render the school useless 
in stopping it.  Different types of chemical agents include biotoxins, blister agents, 
vesicants, blood agents, choking agents and nerve agents.  
A biological agent could be undetectably dispersed in the same fashion, but the 
results and long term effect may not be evident for hours, if not days, depending on the 
agent used.  Effective dispersal of biological agents can be difficult and depends on 
several different variables, many of which cannot be independently managed.  While 
many biological agents are difficult to obtain, many can be easily manufactured, such as 
Ricin from the waste of processing Castor beans.  It can be used in the form of a powder, 
a mist, or can be dissolved in water.  Ricin can be inhaled, such as if it was aerosolized 
and introduced into the building’s HVAC system.  Ricin can also be ingested through 
deliberate contamination of a school’s drinking water supply or food served in the 
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cafeteria.  A dose as little as 500 micrograms (about the size of the head of a pin) is 
enough to kill an adult.  Center for Disease Control reports have indicated that Ricin was 
used in the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980’s and has been found in al Qaeda caves in 
Afghanistan.  Anthrax is a less lethal, but extremely dangerous agent that can be 
purposefully distributed with devastating effects.  In 2001, Anthrax was purposefully 
spread through the U.S. postal system, causing twenty-two cases of Anthrax infection. 
Anthrax can be transmitted through the skin (cutaneous absorption), the lungs 
(inhalation), and digestively (ingestion).  Other less lethal agents could also be used to 
contaminate food and water supply such as Botulism or different strains of Salmonella. 
Radiological attacks are also possible.  Radiological dispersal devices (RDD’s), 
also known as “dirty bombs” can be crudely manufactured using radioactive materials 
acquired from a hospital or medical laboratory or even from a large quantity of smoke 
detectors and combined with conventional explosives.  Most RDD’s would not release 
enough radiation to injure or kill many people, but would create massive fear and panic.  
It would also contaminate the affected area with radiation, rendering it unusable until a 
costly cleanup can be achieved.  A nuclear attack on a school is highly unlikely, though 
not out of the realm of possibility. If terrorists acquired a nuclear device, the size of the 
area affected would be so great that specifically targeting a school building or campus is 
unnecessary.  While still improbable, it is more likely that terrorists would target a 
nuclear reactor, attempting to cause a release of radiological material into the surrounding 
area. 
The most likely attack to occur on a school may be one that utilizes conventional 
weaponry such as firearms and possibly explosive devices.  This conclusion is based on 
the fact that firearms are easy to obtain and are inexpensive.  While military explosive 
devices are difficult to obtain, improvised explosive devices (IED’s) and incendiary 
devices are relatively simple to manufacture with materials that are readily available.  
Highly destructive explosive devices can be quickly and effectively manufactured with 
materials acquired from a local hardware store.  Previous attacks also support this 
conclusion as devices such as these have already been used successfully in school attacks 
such as those used in the Columbine massacre.  Aum Shinrikyo, now known as Aleph, 
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has tried to use non-traditional attack methods nineteen times and has largely failed, 
further supporting the fact that non-traditional attack methods are not always easy to 
carry out, nor are they consistently effective.87  
More important than the attack mechanism itself is the significance of a 
systematic, coordinated attack intended to inflict the most harm and foment the greatest 
amount of panic and hysteria.  Certainly, even the most basic type of attack using 
conventional firearms would be psychologically devastating if coordinated among several 
schools and widely publicized by the media.  
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter examined the rationale to attack a school, the history of school 
attacks, and current threat indicators.  Also included was an analysis of the terrorists and 
their motivation as well as the type of potential attacks that may be utilized.  A thorough 
understanding of the threat provides a framework from which to determine methods to 
prevent and deter attacks through intelligence gathering, fusion and risk and vulnerability 
assessments, both of which are covered in the next chapter. 
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III. PREVENTION AND DETERRENCE 
A. INTELLIGENCE 
Intelligence is probably not the first thing that comes to mind when considering 
preventing an attack on a school.  On the local level, there are various threat indicators 
that can be indicative of an attack.  Terrorists often attempt to gather as much information 
about a target during the planning phase of the attack.  They do this through a variety of 
different types of surveillance activities, including mobile and static surveillance. School 
Resource Officers and school staff can provide counter-surveillance and intelligence by 
watching for things such as: 
1. An interest in school security such as access control or barriers. 
2. An interest in obtaining school site plans, schedules, special events and 
bus routes. 
3. People exhibiting unusual or suspicious behavior such as note taking, 
using still photography or performing video surveillance. 
4. Observation of school safety drills by unknown people. 
5. Asking questions of school personnel or students. 
6. Unidentified vehicles parked in the lot. 
On the regional, state and national level, fusion centers can and should watch for 
trends, providing communication between schools and “putting the pieces together.”  An 
attack on one or more schools in a narrow time frame is likely indicative of additional 
coordinated attacks.  It is critical to gather as much information as quickly as possible 
through a variety of means if this occurs.  Quickly and effectively gathering, analyzing 
and disseminating intelligence could mean the difference of thwarting subsequent attacks. 
Intelligence available to terrorists should be controlled as much as possible.  
Schools must restrict critical information such as school emergency plans, site plans, 
blueprints, and bus routes, yet much of this material can be widely found on the internet.  
Schools should also perform thorough background checks on school employees including 
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contractors, substitute teachers, transportation personnel and volunteers.  A terrorist 
group can gather significant intelligence by having “somebody on the inside.”  As 
previously highlighted, the March 16, 2007, FBI Intelligence Bulletin No. 245 warned of 
an unusual increase in the number of foreign nationals seeking school bus driver 
positions that have had connections with known terrorist groups.  Other areas to be 
closely monitored include food security and delivery and receipt of packages to the 
school.  
School Resource Officers (SROs) are probably the single most important 
intelligence asset that a school can employ.  SROs have formal law enforcement training 
that includes looking for suspicious activities.  Unfortunately, many school districts have 
not budgeted to include an SRO, and many large school districts employ only one SRO to 
cover large campuses comprised of multiple buildings situated on several acres.  SROs 
should have a method in place to communicate signs of an imminent attack not only to 
their local law enforcement agency, but also to the state level to alert analysts in the 
fusion center.  In Israel, school security officers canvass neighborhoods near schools and 
request that local businesses and residents maintain a watchful eye and report any 
suspicious behavior.  Moreover, each police sub-district has police assigned to school 
security duty and they conduct roving patrols.88 
B. RISK AND VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
1. Vulnerability of Children  
Children have significantly different and greater physical and psychological 
vulnerabilities to terrorism than adults.89  Depending on age, children may not be able to 
physically defend themselves or remove themselves from the threat of imminent danger.  
Children are more susceptible to chemical or biological attacks as a greater relative body 
surface area places them at risk for more rapid skin absorption of chemical agents or 
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toxins.  Children are also at a greater risk of hypothermia due to rapid heat transfer via 
the greater body surface area.90  Biological or chemical attacks can have a significant 
effect upon children as compared to adults as these agents concentrate low to the ground 
and closer to the level of a child’s airway.  The skin of young children is also less able to 
resist chemical agent absorption and is highly susceptible to vesicant exposure.91  
Children also have a greater propensity for injury susceptibility.  
Psychologically, children have a significant dependence upon adults for safety, 
security and emotional needs.  As compared to adults, children are helpless and passive, 
lacking the same level of responsiveness.  Obviously, the younger a child, the less likely 
they are to be able to resist physical violence.  A lesser degree of resistance increases the 
vulnerability of a target. It is this high degree of vulnerability that may attract terrorists to 
focus on elementary or middle schools as opposed to a high school or university.   
2. Physical Infrastructure  
A thorough risk and vulnerability assessment should analyze several factors 
regarding the physical infrastructure of schools, beginning with the location.  The 
physical location of a school can present vulnerabilities.  Urban areas schools are usually 
located in populated areas which lend themselves to having significant amounts of 
pedestrian and vehicular traffic.  Generally speaking, it is easier for terrorists to “hide in 
plain sight” in crowded areas to perform surveillance, plan and execute an operation.  
Both vehicles and people in large numbers allow attackers to blend in.  Large campuses 
are widely accessible and offer easy places to hide and blend in with students and 
teachers.  Many large campuses also have large stadiums and arenas which attract large 
crowds. Conversely, a school in a remote area presents challenges for terrorists as 
strangers would appear out of place and therefore draw attention to themselves.  A lack of 
regular vehicular traffic would also draw attention to vehicles such as rental trucks that  
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do not necessarily belong on school property.  The aforementioned circumstances lend 
themselves to be good candidates to be protected by fences, controlled access points and 
surveillance cameras.  
The location of a school can also lend itself to the exploitation of man made 
technological hazards.  A school’s proximity to transportation corridors such as major 
highways or railways can provide an opportunity for terrorists to use a chemical attack by 
purposefully damaging a vessel containing hazardous materials such as a chlorine truck 
or rail tanker near a school.   Likewise, a chemical plant or building storing hazardous 
materials in close proximity to a school can be attacked with conventional explosives, 
thereby causing a cascading destructive effect with the subsequent release of hazardous 
materials into the general area.  Local planners and developers should take these issues 
into account when building new school facilities and when issuing land use permits for 
areas within close proximity to schools.  Schools already situated close to hazards as 
listed above should incorporate appropriate contingencies into their emergency planning 
efforts. 
The actual physical infrastructure of schools is vulnerable in a myriad of ways.  
School facilities range from single small buildings, to extremely large multi-story 
buildings to campuses comprised of both.  Obviously, a single small building would be 
much easier to monitor and protect than large complex campuses.  Schools are heavily 
compartmentalized by design.  This compartmentalization results in “buildings within 
buildings” with a plethora of interconnecting hallways serving as mazes.  As a result of 
modern fire codes, schools can be further compartmentalized by closing large steel fire 
doors in the main corridors.  This compartmentalization in effect creates areas that can be 
easily controlled by a would be attacker or group of attackers.  Many school building 
diagrams are posted on school websites to allow both students and parents to familiarize 
themselves with the layout of the building.  The terrorists can capitalize on this 
information to assist in the planning stages of a coordinated attack.  The Federal Bureau 
of Investigations (FBI) reported that a computer disk found in Iraq included diagrams and 
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photographs of American schools in six states including two in New Jersey.92  
Unfortunately, many public safety agencies do not maintain such plans for quick access 
to the scene of an emergency incident.  In addition to diagrams and floor plans, some 
schools have inexplicably opted to post their entire emergency plans on the internet.  The 
utility of these plans to terrorists is painfully obvious.  Physical security at schools ranges 
widely.  Many schools do not enforce a single point of entry and leave numerous exterior 
doors unlocked.  This allows ingress to the facility from many different points, severely 
limiting the monitoring of individuals entering the building.   
The majority of schools were never designed with the intent to create facilities 
that are resilient to a terrorist attack.   In many cases, windows are accessible from 
ground level and are not constructed with shatter resistant laminated safety glass.  
Heating, ventilation and air condition (HVAC) system intakes are unprotected and 
usually do not have a single point of shutoff.  A terrorist could easily release a biological 
material or chemical agents in sufficient concentration into a single HVAC intake and 
affect large areas of a building, if not the entire building itself.  Due to modern fire codes, 
schools have numerous exterior exit doors located throughout the building.  Schools are 
designed like a sieve to allow the quick exit of students from numerous points throughout 
the building.  Many schools also contain hazardous materials on the premises in the form 
of janitorial supplies or chemistry labs.  Other building design issues should be analyzed 
such as lighting, alarm systems, landscaping, and restricted roof access.  Focusing on 
these issues may not prevent a determined attack, but may help in deterrence.  A building 
with adequate exterior lighting and appropriate landscaping (i.e., not overgrown and close 
to building) makes it much more difficult to perform surveillance and gather information.  
Other issues to consider involve the actual type of construction of the building.  Buildings 
with truss construction and long roof spans are much more susceptible to complete 
collapse from a properly placed explosive device. 
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3. Transportation- School Buses  
Half a million school buses transport twenty five million children to and from 
school each day.93  School buses are extremely vulnerable and have a history of having 
been targets of terrorist attacks.  On May 8, 1970, Palestinian terrorists murdered nine 
children and three adults by attacking a school bus.  Terrorists in Russia, Thailand, Israel, 
Djibouti and Somalia have also attacked school buses.94   Michael Dorn states: 
As an extension of the school itself, school buses in our country are a 
highly symbolic, plentiful and lightly protected target for terrorists who 
intend to commit a high profile attack with relatively few resources.95 
In 2006, two Saudi men wearing trench coats boarded a school bus in Tampa, 
Florida.  Some security consultants believe that they were testing the possibility of how 
easy it would be to attack a school bus in the United States.96  In the early months of 
2007, seventeen full-sized yellow school buses were reported stolen from charter schools, 
businesses schools and private bus companies in Houston, Texas.  Additionally, in 2005, 
more than 2,000 school bus radios were stolen in California.97  It is not hyperbole to 
assert that these events are weak signals of something foreboding to come. 
Michael Dorn asserts that school buses are attractive targets for two reasons:  
transportation is a preferred target of terrorists worldwide, and an attack on a school bus 
would strike fear and panic into the heart of America.  Dorn cites recent congressional 
testimony that 42 percent of international terrorist incidents have focused on 
transportation systems as targets and the Federal Bureau of Investigations has stated that 
40 percent of international mass transit attacks from 1920 to 2000 used buses as targets.  
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Moreover, the history of international attacks with schools as targets shows that almost 
40 percent of attacks have focused on buses as targets.98   
Joint FBI-DHS Bulletin #245 (FOUO) dated March 16, 2007, outlines suspicious 
activities involving school buses.  The activities are highlighted as a number of foreign 
nationals with ties to extremist organizations have been able to purchase school buses and 
acquire licenses to drive them.  Additionally, some school districts have reported an 
unusual increase in the number of foreign nationals seeking school bus driver 
applications.  Subsequent FBI investigations revealed that many applicants had 
connections to known terrorist groups.99  In 2004, the FBI arrested Mohammad Kamel 
Elzahabi for making false statements to the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force.  Further 
investigation revealed that Elzahabi has been employed as a school bus driver and had 
previously served as an instructor at a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and had 
connections to al Qaeda.100 
Buses are extremely vulnerable for several reasons.  Buses generally hold large 
concentrations of people in a relatively small place.  This offers a high degree of control 
for a potential attacker.  The concentration of people and the construction features of the 
bus also make it a deadly vessel in which to use explosives.  A small amount of 
explosives in an enclosed space are as effective or more than large amounts of explosives 
in a building or open area.  When air conditioning or heat is being used and the windows 
are closed, this further compounds the effect of an explosive blast.  Buses are also highly 
predictable, often taking the same exact route every day.  This provides for consistent 
surveillance and planning for an attack.  Buses in the United States offer no protection 
features such as armor like some do in Israel.  In most Israeli urban areas, children utilize 
regular public transportation, of which only a small number have been equipped with 
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armor and countermeasures.  Children in West Bank settlements, however, are usually 
transported in armored buses and accompanied by an army patrol.101 
4. Lack of Training and Response Plans  
There exists an alarming consensus that school emergency preparedness and 
readiness varies widely. A 2005 national survey of School Resource Officers (SRO) 
illustrated the following: 92 percent of SRO’s believe that schools are “soft targets” for 
potential terrorist attacks, 74 percent of SRO’s believe that their schools are inadequately 
prepared to respond to a terrorist attack, half said that emergency plans for their schools 
are not adequate, and 66 percent of SRO’s indicated that their emergency plans are not 
practiced on a regular or ongoing basis.102  A May 17, 2007 report by the United States 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) states that only 32 states have laws or policies 
requiring school districts to have emergency management plans.  An estimated 62 percent 
of school districts identified challenges related to a lack of equipment, training for staff, 
and personnel with expertise in emergency planning.103 
It has been established that school buses are vulnerable targets.  It is not only the 
nature of the vehicle and its utility that make it vulnerable, but the lack of training for the 
driver as well.  Ken Trump of National School Safety and Security Services stated: 
School districts do a great job of training drivers how to drive the bus, but 
a very poor job at training them on security procedures, recognizing and 
reporting strangers, what to do in an emergency situation, how to contact 
the police, what to do when the police show up, what to do if you have 
somebody pull a gun on the bus, what to do if you have a stranger or 
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5. Apathy  
Perhaps the single biggest factor in the lack of school security is apathy.  A 
significant portion of the population lives under the shroud of “it can’t happen to me” or 
“it will never happen here.”  The attacks of 9/11 proved that bad things can and will 
happen here.  It is unfortunate that it often takes tragedy to cause realistic and logical 
concerns to be taken seriously.  History is replete with examples. One such example is 
the tragic fire at Our Lady of Angels School in Chicago in 1958. “Panic hardware” was 
widely available, but rarely installed on exit doors in schools at that time. This fire 
resulted in the unnecessary death of 92 children and three nuns due to inability to exit the 
building.   Will it take a significant tragedy at a school in the United States for parents 
and administrators to put protection measures into place, or will it be done voluntarily as 
a pre-emptive initiative? 
A great deal of apathy also stems from taxpayer frustration.  School district 
expenses account for the lion’s share of many people’s property taxes.  People do not 
want to pay more taxes and in many cases vote against referendums necessary to keep 
schools financially solvent.  Hypocritically, many of the same government spending 
watchdogs will be the first to point fingers and assign blame to school administrators 
when a tragedy does occur.  Moreover, many school administrators do not feel any 
urgency and assign little priority to school security with respect to available budgets. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter examined the utility of intelligence gathering and fusion and the 
significance of risk and vulnerability assessments.  Once intelligence activities are 
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IV. PREPAREDNESS  
A. PLANNING  
The planning process is the foundation and backbone of homeland security 
programs and emergency response for schools.  School administrators should not develop 
plans in a vacuum; they should make sure that school emergency plans are developed as a 
part of a community wide planning process to insure that a diversity of knowledge is 
instilled into the process and resulting plan.  Stakeholders should be identified and 
included early on in the initial phases of the planning process.  Planning is not a static 
process, but is dynamic and should reflect changes made as a result of input from all 
stakeholders as well as weaknesses discovered during the evaluation phase.   
Nancy Degnan argues that school officials need to work with the idea of 
partnering with public safety personnel and other stakeholders in the disaster 
preparedness process.104  But who exactly are the stakeholders?  Michael Dorn and Chris 
Dorn of Safe Havens International appropriately describe the stakeholder relationship in 
protecting schools as follows: 
School safety is the business, not only of school officials, but also of law 
enforcement officers, paramedics, firefighters, emergency management 
personnel, public health officials, mental health professionals and a host of 
other local, state and federal experts.105 
Clearly, all of the agencies that will be involved in the initial emergency response to an 
incident involving a school are key stakeholders; other agencies that are not a part of the 
initial response but will play an important role during the recovery phase are vital 
stakeholders as well. 
The emergency response community and the fire department in particular, have a 
long history of developing, implementing, exercising and evaluating emergency plans.  
                                                 
104 Dorn and Dorn, Innocent Targets, 84.  
105 Ibid. 
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Accordingly, the U.S. Department of Education’s Practical Information on Crisis 
Planning:  A Guide for Schools and Communities contends that “crisis plans should be 
developed in partnership with other community groups, including law enforcement, fire 
safety officials, emergency health services, as well as health and mental health 
professionals.”106 Many planning and response “templates” have burgeoned from the 
emergency response community, such as the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS), which was birthed from the California Department of Forestry incident 
command system utilized to coordinate operations at major forest fires.  In short, public 
safety agencies are particularly well suited to assist schools with developing 
comprehensive emergency response plans. 
Dr. Robert Gillio, founder of Innerlink, an innovative developer of safety and 
health technology solutions for schools, warns that, “A generic school response plan can 
almost be as worthless as no plan at all.  It is necessary to create a plan specifically 
designed for your school- one that takes into consideration the unique needs and threats 
of each and every school’s environment.” Dr. Gillio also argues that “Administrators 
absolutely must design their crisis response plan with input from local law enforcement, 
first responders, parents, community members, and any other local stakeholders who will 
be affected should a crisis occur.”107 
One the best planning resources discovered in the course of this research is the 
Multihazard Emergency Planning for Illinois Schools program.  This program 
recommends the following steps in building a reliable, valid and sustainable emergency 
operations planning process:108 
1. Identify the planning team. 
2. Identify the hazards. 
3. Analyze the hazards to determine the vulnerabilities. 
                                                 
106 Department of Education,  Practical Information on Crisis Planning, 1. 
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4. Develop the plan. 
5. Develop a resource base. 
6. Train and exercise the plan. 
At a minimum, the planning team should consist of school administrators such as the 
superintendent, principles and assistants, as well as the coordinators of food service, 
transportation, facilities and grounds and legal counsel.  Other valuable members from 
the school itself may include teachers and staff members with helpful backgrounds such 
as the school nurse or science and chemistry teachers.  Other stakeholders outside of the 
school itself include local emergency managers, public safety personnel, utility company 
representatives, hospital representatives, and volunteer agencies in the community such 
as the Red Cross or Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT). 
 The planning group can work collectively to identify potential hazards and 
analyze the hazards for potential vulnerabilities.  There are a number of hazard analysis 
matrices and worksheets available from FEMA to use as a guideline.  With each 
identified hazard, a value should be assigned to the potential frequency, magnitude, 
warning time, severity and risk priority.   This process can assist in prioritizing response 
plans and assigning resources.  A school located directly adjacent to transportation 
corridors or in close proximity to a chemical plant poses unique risks that must be 
addressed accordingly and commensurately.  Structural engineers in the community can 
assist in evaluating structural hazards unique to certain buildings.  Their evaluation may 
impact certain response plans such as not designating shelter in place plans in a section of 
a building with broad unsupported roof spans or unreinforced masonry construction.  
Similarly, local experts with experience in heating, ventilation and air conditioning 
(HVAC) systems can evaluate the HVAC systems for vulnerabilities in outside access as 
well as offer solutions for quick and efficient control of HVAC systems when necessary, 
as in the case of an inside or outside chemical release. 
Based on the hazard assessment and vulnerability analysis, the planning team can 
create a comprehensive emergency operations plan (EOP).  The Multihazard Emergency 
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Planning for Illinois Schools program outlines the general framework of what a good 
emergency operations plan should include as follows:109 
1. The emergencies that will be planned for. 
2. How district officials will know that a threat exists. 
3. How the district will respond. 
4. How the district will support operations. 
5. The steps that the district will take to recover. 
The EOP should include all of the necessary information required in an 
emergency such as personnel assignments, emergency contact numbers for all  
school personnel as well as local response agencies.  Evacuation routes as well as 
assembly and reunification areas should be identified and documented.  The Multihazard 
Emergency Planning for Illinois Schools program states that EOPs should be 
comprehensive, all-hazard in approach, flexible and risk-based.  The program also states 
that comprehensive plans should include information about:110 
1. How the response will be coordinated. 
2. How school personnel will communicate. 
3. How school personnel will be notified. 
4. How parents (and guardians) will be notified. 
5. Who will deal with the media and how. 
FEMA also recommends that school plans describe: 
1. When an evacuation will be ordered (standard evacuations and reverse 
evacuations). 
2. How and when sheltering in place will be accomplished. 
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3. How students and personnel will be provided with essential supplies such as food, 
water, and medical supplies. 
4. How will the school locate, obtain, and distribute resources. 
Schools and public safety agencies would benefit tremendously if they developed 
response plans in tandem and worked together towards a common goal. When an actual 
emergency incident occurs, whether terrorist attack or otherwise, each responding agency 
will have different goals and objectives.  It is critical that agencies work collectively and 
collaboratively to insure that the goals of one agency are not antithetical to another, and 
hence counterproductive to mitigating the situation efficiently and effectively.   
There are various agencies that offer planning and preparedness programs and 
implementation strategies to assist in developing and implementing a multi-disciplinary 
response.  One such system, the Rapid Responder Crisis Management System© has been 
awarded the Department of Homeland Security’s Safety Act Certification Award and the 
Focus on Innovation Award from the National Homeland Defense Foundation. Rapid 
Responder is a crisis management planning system developed by Prepared Response®, 
headquartered in Seattle, Washington.  This system allows facility personnel, police and 
fire units access to hundreds of site-specific data points, including pre-established tactical 
plans, floor plans, satellite images, interior and exterior photos, staging areas, hazardous 
materials locations, utility shut-offs, and evacuation routes for virtually any facility.  
During a 2003 event at a high school in Spokane, Washington, this system facilitated 
local emergency responders in containing an armed student within twelve minutes.  
Within twenty minutes, more than 2,000 students were safely and efficiently evacuated. 
A system such as this can also serve as prevention through deterring terrorists looking for 
an “easy mark.”  This innovative system is currently being installed in 1,275 middle and 
elementary schools in the states of Washington, Arizona, California, Missouri, Idaho, 
North and South Carolina.111 
It is not necessary for schools and public safety agencies to use a system as listed 
above, as helpful as they might be.  Fiscal constraints may prohibit the purchase of a 
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commercial system.  What is critically important is that the different agencies work 
together towards a common goal.  Involving all stakeholders in developing a plan, 
exercising the plan, identifying deficiencies, making adjustments and refining the plan 
will insure an effective coordinated response effort when an emergency occurs. 
B. ORGANIZATION 
It is critical that proper and formal organizational structure is determined and 
institutionalized prior to having to deal with an emergency incident.  An excellent 
organizational framework that schools can and should use is the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS).  Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5, 
Management of Domestic Incidents, requires federal agencies to adopt and implement the 
NIMS and requires state and local government to implement the NIMS to receive federal 
preparedness funding.  The applies to school districts as the Homeland Security Act of 
2002, Section 2(10) defines the term “local government” as including school districts.  
 The NIMS is a comprehensive system that improves and enhances local 
emergency response operations through the utilization of the Incident Command System.  
The system provides for the understanding and application of standardized emergency 
procedures and preparedness measures.  The NIMS provides a consistent approach and 
common terminology for federal, state and local governments to work together efficiently 
and effectively during emergency response operations.  The NIMS integration center 
provides a checklist in the form of a matrix that can be applied to school districts.  The 
checklist outlines the required activities and responsible parties as follows: 
1. Adopt NIMS at the community level.  Responsible party- school district 
administration or school board in partnership with local government. 
2. Institutionalize the Incident Command System.  Responsible party- school district 
crisis team(s). 
3. Formalize a public information system and a joint information system.  
Responsible party- school district public information officer. 
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4. Update emergency plans to integrate NIMS.  Responsible party- school district 
crisis team(s). 
5. Establish NIMS baseline and current progress.  Responsible party- school district 
administration. 
6. Complete IS-700 NIMS: An Introduction and IS-800 The National Response 
Plan: An Introduction.  Responsible party- school district administration and key 
personnel. 
7. Complete ICS-100 and ICS-200. Responsible party- school district administration 
and key personnel. 
8. Utilize ICS and NIMS terminology during all tabletop and full-scale exercises, 
and most importantly, actual emergencies.  Responsible party- key personnel and 
local emergency response personnel. 
9. Incorporate corrective actions and lessons learned into updated emergency 
operations plan(s). 
School administrators and planning committees should identify what staff will be 
involved in the school’s emergency response and recruit and create critical incident 
response teams (CIRT) using the ICS model.  Using this model, the school should 
develop a “concept of operations” which should include:112 
1. An organization chart. 
2. A statement about when and how the emergency plan will be implemented. 
3. A definition of action levels and their implementation. 
4. Which action levels will be implemented, under whose authority and when. 
5. The general sequence of actions, before, during, and after the emergency. 
6. Designation of who will coordinate with local and state responders and how the 
coordination will take place. 
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The CIRT should be overseen by the principal or assistant principal, who will be 
designated as the incident commander.  When forming the CIRT, major areas of need 
should be taken into consideration such as:113 
1. Physical/medical needs. 
2. Emotional/mental health needs. 
3. Students with special needs. 
4. Staff from all areas of the building and campus. 
5. Staff with knowledge of floor plans, utilities, other special areas. 
6. Staff with ability to communicate with media effectively. 
7. Staff knowledgeable in community resources. 
Many of these special skills can be ascertained by having all staff complete a survey 
measuring specific knowledge, skills and abilities.  An illustration of a sample school ICS 

















Figure 2.   Sample ICS Organizational Chart 
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It is imperative that schools work closely with outside response agencies to insure 
that their respective organizational structures integrate and compliment one another 
during an actual emergency incident.  Administrators should work with response 
personnel in the planning process and have them assist in developing the emergency 
operations plan.  The school’s organizational plan when integrated with the 




Figure 3.   Unified Command ICS Organizational Chart 
 
Schools should also plan for continuity of operations with respect to the 
established organizational structure.  There should not only be a chain of command, but a 
line of succession in the event of a key member being absent or becoming a casualty 
during an incident.  There should be two trained alternates for each CIRT position.  This 
plan should filter all the way down to individual teachers, who should establish a buddy 
system.  Both teachers should have rosters for both classes and both classes should 
evacuate to the same area and go to the same predetermined safe areas.  Approximately 
half of the staff should fill ICS positions and half should take care of the students.  
Additionally, positions should be assigned to those most qualified for each position, not 
according to seniority. 
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Schools should develop critical incident response kits that contain detailed check 
lists and are updated regularly.  The kits should be maintained in an accessible area and 
be readily available to provide first responders with critical information immediately.  A 
well-planned critical emergency response kit should include:114 
1. Emergency and crisis operations plans. 
2. Maps and floor plans. 
3. Master keys, access cards or door codes. 
4. Emergency contact numbers. 
5. Portable radio with channel lists. 
6. Utility shut off locations and procedures. 
7. Aerial photographs of school and site plans. 
8. ICS vests identifying different positions. 
9. Student and staff photographs. 
10. Cellular phone with extra batteries. 
11. Basic emergency supplies. 
Since the main office may be unusable or unsafe in the event of an incident, staff 
should be prepared to work from any location.  Accordingly, forms and documentation 
that should be included are: 
1. Evacuation plans. 
2. Alternate evacuation plans. 
3. Student and staff schedules. 
4. Current daily attendance roster. 
5. Bus route schedules with student rosters. 
6. Press release templates. 
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7. Parent notification templates. 
8. Student release forms. 
9. ICS assignment forms. 
C. EQUIPMENT 
Equipment in this context is considered those physical resources necessary to 
effectively implement established emergency operating plans and efficiently sustain those 
operations for a minimum of seventy-two hours.  The ability to communicate between 
school officials and to local response agencies is perhaps the most important equipment 
need.  Communication can be achieved throughout the entire school and between the 
main office and classrooms via the school’s address/intercom system.  Staff should also 
have the means to communicate with the office and key personnel either by cell phone or 
portable radio.  Key staff should have the ability to communicate with other response 
agencies during an incident as well.   
The ability to monitor areas of the school and developing situations is critical. 
Surveillance cameras are a cost-effective, time tested technology that can provide 
monitoring of multiple locations and areas with less people.  Newer, but less cost 
effective technology that can be employed to monitor areas includes sophisticated sensor 
systems that can detect the presence of explosives, chemical and biological agents.  The 
technology of most biological sensing instruments however, still does not provide for 
immediate detection of many different, yet deadly biological agents. 
Also necessary are basic supplies such as food, water and sanitation supplies for a 
self sustainment period of not less than seventy-two hours.  Medical supplies should be 
maintained in sufficient quantity and in strategic locations throughout the school.  Ideally, 
each classroom should maintain a minimal amount of equipment in the event of a 
prolonged hard lockdown procedure.  An adequate supply insures that secure 
compartmentalization would not be disrupted due to a lack of basic supplies strategically 
placed in multiple locations. 
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D. TRAINING  
The most well written comprehensive plans are useless if staff required to follow 
them are not properly trained.  There are a variety of incident command courses available 
through FEMA that can be completed on line.  All school personnel should be trained 
with a basic understanding of the incident command system and the school’s emergency 
operations plans.  Critical incident response team members should be trained to the level 
they are expected to function at.  School administrators, particularly those that will be 
designated the school incident commander should receive training to the appropriate 
levels of incident command, particularly those that educate participants how unified 
command works at a large scale incident.  
Schools and local public safety agencies need to be an integral part of 
communitywide plans.  Comprehensive, multi-hazard emergency management plans 
must be developed and implemented by local public health, law enforcement, emergency 
response, and education agencies together.  Joint trainings are one way to build 
partnerships across multi-disciplinary trainings.115  Public safety agencies generally offer 
a wide array of educational programs that can be delivered to school personnel including 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, first aid, and automated external defibrillator use.  A 
study of teachers in Missouri, Arkansas and Kansas revealed that one third had not 
received training in first aid, and 40 percent had not received training in cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation.  The data indicated that public school teachers “lacked the adequate 
emergency care knowledge and skills” due to a lack of training and incentives for 
training. This revelation, coupled with the fact that schools are essentially “in loco 
parentis,” and that school officials have a special responsibility for the students’ care is 
especially troubling.  There seems to be a gap in the public’s expectation of teachers and 
the emergency care they can actually provide in times of crisis.  Public safety agencies 
have the experience and knowledge to fill that gap by providing specific training for 
school personnel. 
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E. EXERCISES 
Emergency plans must be exercised and cannot be static; they must be fluid and 
reassessed based on current extenuating circumstances.116 Kenneth Trump, the President 
of National School and Safety Security Services also recommends sharing blueprints of 
school buildings to local public safety agencies and allowing them to train on campus on 
weekends so they can become more familiar with the layout.117  The document School 
Safety in the 21st Century: Adapting to New Security Challenges Post 9/11 focuses on 
operational strategy and tactics.  An “all hazards” approach is utilized.  The document 
asserts that preparedness planning, training, and collaboration between schools (staff, 
faculty, students, parents), public safety agencies (police, fire, and emergency medical), 
and government emergency management authorities can mitigate the impact of 
emergencies, improve response, and accelerate recovery. The document closely evaluates 
school accountability, emergency plans, crisis management teams, the role of the parent, 
safety assessments and exercises.118 
Exercising a school’s emergency plan provides school staff and other stakeholders 
the opportunity to identify strengths and weaknesses in the plans, but also provide for 
meaningful collaboration with local emergency response agencies and the general public. 
There are two basic types of exercises.  Tabletop exercises provide for a real time discussion 
of plans, policies and procedures as they relate to a given scenario.  They also provide an 
opportunity to clarify and resolve issues concerning overall coordination, roles and 
responsibilities.  Functional, or full scale, exercises test specific plan functions and can be 
designed to test one function at a time or several concurrently.  Functional exercises require 
approximately nine to twelve months to plan for, depending on the scope and complexity.  
Types of functional exercises that could be designed and executed by a school would be 
student care, student accounting, medical treatment, reunification, evacuation, reverse 
evacuation, and shelter in place plans.  All agencies responsible for components of the plan 
being tested should be involved early in the planning process.  A multidisciplinary approach 
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to exercise planning and design insures a more realistic exercise that addresses the 
specific concerns of each of the parties involved. 
The most important component of the exercise process is identifying weaknesses 
in established emergency plans and the corresponding response through a critical 
evaluation of the exercise.  This is an excellent opportunity for different agencies to 
determine shortcomings in communications and collaboration in the response phase in a 
controlled environment.  This is also the appropriate time to reveal resource needs and 
improve coordination. The ultimate goal should be to make the necessary adjustments 
and modifications to the emergency plan so response efforts work effectively in tandem 
during an actual emergency incident. 
F. DEVELOPING PSYCHOLOGICAL RESILIENCY—PRE-EVENT PHASE 
Notwithstanding a tremendous amount of preparation, an attack by a dedicated, 
determined terrorist or group of terrorists cannot always be prevented.  The effects and 
impact of the attack, however, can be mitigated through comprehensive pre-incident 
planning, effective response guidelines, and psychological recovery initiatives.  This 
section deals primarily with developing psychological resiliency and is separated into the 
three components of pre-event, event and post event initiatives.  Butler, et al state: 
The psychological consequences of terrorism are an important determinant 
of the continuity of society, economic resiliency, health care utilization, 
and perception of threat and safety.119   
As a result, they argue that the area of psychology must be integrated into 
national, state and local planning120 and that psychological consequences must receive 
comparable attention to other consequences in response to terrorism.121   
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Newspapers mentioned that a recent survey showed that seven out of 
every ten Americans suffer psychological problems following the attacks 
on New York and Washington. 
 — Osama bin Laden to Mullah Omar.122   
The attacks on 9/11 produced a tremendous reaction across the country and 
around the world.  Days after the attacks, approximately 90 percent of the residents of 
New York City and Washington D.C. reported significant psychological distress and 20 
percent of all Americans reported symptoms of distress.123  The central goal of terrorism 
is to cause fear and panic; however fear and panic can be lessened or controlled with 
proper preparation. 
The pre-event phase can be defined as the activities that take place prior to an 
event or terrorist attack.  Preparedness is a central component in pre-event planning.  
Preparedness is a critical first step in effectively dealing with acts of terrorism from many 
perspectives, including response and recovery.  Brandon and Silke purport that a 
preparedness strategy that focuses on fear can create a chronic state of anxiety that can 
deplete individual and community resources.  They argue that instead, a strategy that 
highlights our strengths and capacity for recovery would not only save resources, but may 
even help create them.124  Anticipating or envisioning an attack is a helpful way in which 
to initiate the planning process.  The 9/11 Commission criticized key officials for a lack 
of imagination in not anticipating aircraft being used as missiles, particularly from within 
the continental United States.  A national dialogue of unexpected attacks (to include 
schools) would provide a basis from which to analyze what could occur but also involve 
the public so that the practices of communities and their potential responses could assist 
in the development of response and recovery strategies.  Brandon and Silke state: 
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To the extent that Americans begin to view terrorist attacks in other 
countries as occurring, in some sense, also to ourselves, our expectations 
should begin to change so that even the unimaginable, such as a school 
bombing , is perceived as “experienced,” if only vicariously.125   
The Haddon Matrix is a model for organizing responses to terrorism within 
various phases and factors involved in the events.  This model offers a useful way to 
organize components of the mental health and emergency response systems for 
prevention and intervention.126 Specific pre-event planning activities that schools and 
public safety agencies should undertake to develop psychological resilience include the 
following factors adapted from the Haddon Matrix: 
1. Open and honest discussion about the grim reality and potential effects of a 
terrorist attack upon a school. 
2. Psychological first aid training for all school staff, and local public safety 
employees. 
3. Integrate psychological and mental health concerns into emergency plans. 
4. Exercise the response plan through regular tabletop and full scale drills to 
familiarize affected people with expectations before an attack occurs. 
5. Develop strategies to address mental health needs of students, faculty, and 
public safety personnel. 
6. Initiate and sustain relationships with mental health professionals and develop 
a plan to contact and utilize them during times of crisis. 
7. Develop reunion protocols to release students to family members as soon as 
practicable during or after an event. 
8. Prepare materials and protocols for media release and public education.  
Spokespersons should be identified in advance and trained appropriately. 
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School personnel serve as defacto emergency response workers, responsible for the 
food, shelter, and physical and emotional well-being of children in their care.  Safety issues 
that are addressed prior to a terrorism event can give reassurance to parents whose children 
may require site evacuation, quarantine measures, reunion protocols, or sheltering in place 
for twenty-four to seventy-two hours.127  Emergency plan that take parents into 
consideration help create the sense that the children will be well cared for and will not be left 
alone.  This sense alone will lessen the concern of many parents, thereby ameliorating 
widespread panic. 
Another significant concern is how to deal with a situation in which one or more of 
the emergency response personnel have children that are involved in the incident itself.  It is 
unlikely that these personnel will be able to effectively cope with the situation and perform 
their assigned duties.  Indeed, there may be a significant portion of the workforce lost if a 
large percentage of emergency services personnel have children in school, especially in the 
same community.  Even if the families of the first responders are not directly involved, they 
will still be concerned about the safety and well-being of their families while they are at the 
scene and this may affect their job performance.  Butler, et al recommend looking to military 
models to develop and improve the psychological support services necessary to facilitate the 
efforts of the employees.128  First responders must be psychologically prepared to deal with 
the worst possible circumstances and an attack on a school certainly qualifies. 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed and reflected on the preparedness activities that schools 
can employ.  This discussion included dimensions and elements such as the emergency 
planning process, staff organizational structures, necessary equipment, training, 
conducting both table top and full-scale exercises, and finally, developing psychological 
resiliency prior to an attack.  Comprehensive and deliberate preparedness activities are 
central to developing effective emergency response plans and procedures.  Emergency 
response to potential threats and specific events is analyzed in the next chapter in tandem 
with methodologies to support psychological resiliency during an attack. 
                                                 
127 Butler, Panzer and Goldfrank, Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism, 110. 
















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 65
V. EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
Emergency response protocols can be implemented in one of two situations or 
scenarios.   One scenario is a potential threat, where a threat or potential of threat exists, 
but no actual act of violence has been committed at the school in question.  The other 
situation would be one in which an actual incident has occurred at or in proximity to the 
school, necessitating the implementation of a specific emergency incident protocol.  In 
each scenario, both schools and local response agencies have certain responsibilities and 
specific protocols to follow. 
A. POTENTIAL THREAT  
Several different situations can be treated as a potential threat.  Both 
substantiated, credible, and unsubstantiated non-credible intelligence reports can be 
treated as a threat, albeit with varying levels of response.  On a national level, schools 
should monitor the Homeland Security Advisory System color-coded levels and have 
action plans in place to be implemented with each successive increase in risk of attack 
level.  The American Red Cross has developed a general guideline of recommended 
actions for schools based upon the threat advisory system.129  The recommendations at 
the low (green) and guarded (blue) levels include primarily preparedness activities such 
as educating staff and conducting emergency drills using the school’s established 
emergency plan.  The elevated (yellow) level includes recommendations to be alert to 
suspicious activity and to check stocks of emergency supplies.  The high (orange) level 
recommends reporting any suspicious activity to local law enforcement agencies, 
reviewing emergency plans, and preparing for inquiries from parents and media.  The 
severe (red) level recommends all of the recommendations at lower levels and including  
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monitoring radio and television for current information or instructions, immediately 
reporting any and all suspicious activity, 100 percent identification check and escorting 
anyone entering the school other than staff. 
Notwithstanding a comprehensive analysis, preliminary considerations suggest 
that schools should also consider taking the same actions including canceling outside 
activities, canceling school altogether or implementing lock down procedures if other 
school attacks occur and especially if notified of other attacks through their local law 
enforcement agencies.  This is a function that can be served by state fusion centers.  
When a fusion center becomes aware of school attacks in other regions or states, it should 
have a method to quickly and efficiently disseminate that information to every school 
district within its jurisdiction.  In addition to lock downs, schools need to have plans in 
place for students off campus on field trips. 
B. EVENT SPECIFIC 
In Chapter II — Threat Analysis, several different types of possible attacks were 
discussed.  It is imperative that schools develop specific response plans for each different 
type of attack in collaboration with local emergency response agencies.  Each type of 
incident may warrant widely differing response protocols.  For example, a release of a 
chemical outside of a building would require shelter in place protocols whereas a 
chemical release within a building would necessitate an immediate evacuation.  Speed 
and efficiency of response will be critical, regardless of the type of scenario.    
In the initial phases of an incident, school staff will be assuming the role of first 
responders and will have to rely on their own plans and resources until emergency 
responders arrive.  In urban areas, response should be relatively quick, but may be 
prolonged significantly in the event of multiple incidents occurring in the form of a 
coordinated systematic attack.  School staff must be prepared for this contingency and be 
able to act on their own for a period of time if necessary.  Although actions schools must 
take in the initial phase of an incident vary widely, general basics include: 
1. Gathering intelligence- location of incident, type of incident, number and 
location of intruders, description of intruders, weapons present, injuries, etc. 
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2. Follow the appropriate checklist based upon the situation- alert over address 
system, evacuation, reverse evacuation, and lock down. 
3. Clear students from hallways and open areas, shelter students as appropriate 
and provide medical care as necessary. 
4. Account for students- report to main office or school incident commander as 
necessary and appropriate. 
5. Reroute buses if necessary. 
6. Other facility specific actions- shutting down HVAC systems, sealing off 
areas of building, etc. 
7. Brief arriving law enforcement officers and emergency responders as quickly 
as possible. 
For the emergency responders, time is of the essence.  The fact that they have 
been dispatched to a school for an incident means that the attackers already have a head 
start.  Giduck argues that when an attack occurs in the United States, it will be local law 
enforcement that respond initially and may be on their own for hours until the FBI’s HRT 
arrives, if they are called in at all.  He also points out that the Posse Comitatus Act 
prohibits U.S. military from functioning in a military or law enforcement capacity on 
U.S. soil.130  Giduck also claims that a Beslan type situation will present a conundrum for 
which we are unprepared.  Once it has been determined that a hostage taking is of a 
terrorist nature, and not a criminal offense, the federal government will assume 
jurisdiction.  The previous strategy of local or federal law enforcement agencies has 
always been to negotiate with hostage takers, but the doctrine of the United States is not 
to negotiate with terrorists.131 
It is likely that terrorists attacking a school may be doing so to make a political 
statement, have no intention on negotiating, and ultimately plan on mass murder, as they 
did in Beslan.  If this is true, it is critical that responding agencies act swiftly, to reduce 
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the overall loss of life.  It has been said that the first twenty minutes of an incident will 
determine the next several hours.  A concept currently being taught to law enforcement 
rapid response and entry teams is the OODA loop.  This concept was designed by 
military strategist Colonel John Boyd of the United States Air Force.  According to Boyd, 
decision making occurs in a distinct cycle.  This cycle consists of observe, orient, decide 
and act. An individual or group that can process this cycle quickly, observing and 
reacting to unfolding events more rapidly than an opponent, can thereby infiltrate the 
opponent's decision cycle and gain an operational advantage.  Boyd explained that the 
OODA loop is actually a set of interacting loops that are kept in continuous operation 
during combat. Boyd’s diagram below illustrates that decisions are based on observations 
of the evolving situation mitigated with intrinsic filtering of the problem being addressed. 
 
Figure 4.   OODA Loop from Colonel John Boyd 
 
Joe Bierly believes that the OODA loop can be compressed through planning and 
actions in advance of an incident such as pre-planning, walk-throughs, rehearsals, 
exercises, staged gear and equipment, N-hour sequence, forward deployment and quickly 
communicated mission orders.132 Advance planning, preparation, and a quick and 
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IL, November 14, 2007. 
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efficient response by emergency personnel will be central to saving lives in dealing with 
a terrorist attack on a school.  Entry teams must make contact and engage the attackers as 
quickly as possible.  The more time the attackers are permitted to continue their siege, the 
more fortified their position will become, rendering subsequent counter offensive 
measures less effective. 
C. SUPPORTING PSYCHOLOGICAL RESILIENCY—EVENT PHASE  
The event phase can be defined as the activities that take place during an actual 
emergency in the form of a terrorist attack or other disaster.  In disaster situations, people 
who work to save themselves and others are more likely to survive and be healthy than 
people who shrink in fright.  A terrorist attack is vastly different than a typical hostage 
situation whereby the hostage takers or hijackers use human collateral to bargain with 
another party to reach a desired outcome.  In the event of a terrorist attack, potential 
victims must be prepared to fight for their lives.  On 9/11, a primary reaction of the 
American people was one of challenge and refusal to cower as victims.  The response 
was significantly problem focused and not emotion focused.133 
Specific pre-event planning activities that schools and public safety agencies 
should undertake to support psychological resilience include the following factors 
adapted from the Haddon Matrix:134 
1. Implement a public health-mental health response. 
2. Provide basic needs and interventions. 
3. Implement psychological first aid. 
4. Distribute information appropriate to the event. 
5. Describe to the public the available organizational and communication 
systems. 
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Accurate and timely disseminated public information is vital in lessening or 
avoiding mass hysteria and panic.  Butler et al argue that the provision of clear, credible, 
and timely information during and after an attack is a critical aspect of response.  The 
importance of immediately available, consistently open communication cannot be 
overstated.135  Such communication has a significant impact on lessening fear and 
anxiety and should be made readily available to the media for mass dissemination to the 
public.  If the media is not provided with timely and accurate information, it may 
speculate regarding details of the incident and report false information which can incite 
fear and panic.  History is replete with instances of inaccurate information being 
broadcast to the public. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Emergency response is a critical component in neutralizing an attacker or group 
of attackers and minimizing the impact on life safety to students and staff.  Federal assets 
may take a significant amount of time to arrive on the scene, so schools and local 
response agencies must be prepared and train for the worst case scenario.  Emergency 
personnel, especially law enforcement, must be mentally prepared to act with alacrity and 
dispatch to counterbalance any advantage the attackers the attackers may have and 
quickly defuse the situation.  Once the situation is rendered safe, psychological recovery 
should be made a priority.  Schools should also have formal plans in place to insure the 
continuity of operations. 
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VI. RECOVERY 
A. SUSTAINING PSYCHOLOGICAL RESILIENCY—POST EVENT PHASE 
The post-event phase can be defined as the period immediately after a terrorist 
attack has ended and the threat is neutralized.  This phase can also be called the recovery 
phase.  Specific pre-event planning activities that schools and public safety agencies 
should undertake to sustain psychological resilience include the following factors adapted 
from the Haddon Matrix:136 
1. Minimize secondary consequences. 
2. Continue psychological first aid. 
3. Conduct assessments to identify specific needs for treatment of 
psychological injury. 
4. Consider intervention needs of special populations. 
5. Communicate that preparedness helped decrease the impact of the attack 
(if appropriate). 
6. Produce public information and warnings. 
7. Promote family and community cohesion. 
8. Evaluate effectiveness of emergency plan and response. 
9. Establish strategies for community healing. 
The desired end results of these factors adapted from the Haddon Matrix are:137 
Mitigate or prevent adverse consequences including: 
1. Distress. 
2. Negative behavioral change. 
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3. Psychiatric illness. 
4. Poor job performance or loss of job. 
5. Physical injury. 
6. Increase positive adaptive behaviors. 
7. Facilitate posttraumatic growth. 
8. Increase empowerment. 
9. Provide an environment that allows for rapid recovery and rehabilitation. 
10. Minimize disruption in daily routines of life. 
11. Enhance community cohesion. 
As stated previously, the primary purpose of terrorism is the widespread infliction 
of psychological pain.138  If we invest in preparedness, response and recovery activities 
that develop psychological resiliency, we severely blunt the desired and intended effects 
of a terrorist attack.  By doing so, we effectively deal a blow to the terrorist’s “arsenal.” 
B. CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS  
Michael and Chris Dorn emphasize the importance of returning to “business as 
usual.”  They state that Israel police officials stress the need for citizens, businesses, 
governmental agencies and other impacted organizations to return to normal business as 
quickly as possible after an attack.  They claim if this is not accomplished, the impact of 
the actual event is greatly increased.139  They also argue that a society that allows acts of 
terrorism to significantly disrupt how people function on a daily basis may increase the 
likelihood of future attacks and may invite more attacks of the same type.140  
Accordingly, in addition to plans for mental health recovery, schools should have plans 
for continuity of operations. 
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An attack may result in incapacitation of school staff and teachers and may render 
the building uninhabitable for a period of time.  Larger school districts may be able to 
relay upon multiple facilities to divide the load of students amongst.  Smaller school 
districts should consider developing formal memorandums of understanding or other 
assistance agreements with neighboring schools districts if assistance is needed.  For 
disruptions of limited duration, schools could consider temporary distance learning 
activities through teleconference or other web based programs.  If these plans are put into 
place prior to a significant incident, the transition towards “getting back to normal” will 
run more smoothly. 
According to a May 17, 2007 report by the United States Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), few school districts emergency plans contain procedures 
for student education in the event of an extended closure even though it is a federally 
recommended practice.  The report claims that 56 percent of school districts surveyed do 
not include plans for continuation during an extended school closure.  The report 
continues to highlight that 30 percent of schools have a procedure to use electronic means 
or telephone trees to communicate academic information to students, 12 percent of 
schools provide for web-based learning instruction, 10 percent provide for mailed lessons 
and assignments, and 7 percent provide for academic instruction through local radio or 
television stations.141 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The intent of terrorism is to terrorize.  Terror and fear are exacerbated and 
protracted in the absence of plans to sustain psychological resiliency and return to normal 
operations.  Formal plans for mental health recovery and continuity of operations are 
central to minimizing and counteracting the impact of a terrorist attack.  Much can be 
learned about these and previously mentioned homeland security activities by analyzing 
the current practices of school districts in the United States and abroad. 
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VII. COMPARATIVE ANALYSES/CASE STUDIES 
A. SCHOOL PROTECTION IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
1. The Beslan Experience- Important Lessons Learned 
The most heinous terrorist attack on a school occurred in the small town of 
Beslan, near the troubled Russian republic of Chechnya in September of 2004.  A total of 
323 hostages, including 186 children, died in the school terrorist siege.  What the United 
States can learn from this tragedy is not entirely about what went right, but more about 
what went horribly wrong, and the implications for the United States.  
The terrorists in the Beslan attack were primarily ethnic Ingush and Chechen 
Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi sect who were demanding the release of prisoners captured 
during the Nazran raid and the complete withdraw of Russian troops from Chechnya.  
Unique to the Beslan attack is the participation of Chechen female suicide bombers also 
known as the Black Widows.142  This is a group of Muslim Chechen women who have 
survived the deaths of their own husbands and family members and have been recruited 
to serve as human bombs in terrorist attacks.143  Atypical attackers (women) on an 
atypical target (children) set this attack apart from previous attacks seen up to this point 
and exemplify the changing face of violence in the world. 
Terrorism can be an overwhelming psychological phenomenon.  When the public 
gets scared, it overreacts, causing a litany of other problems in the wake of the initial 
event.  Undoubtedly, an attack on children in an educational institution in the United 
States would create mass panic and hysteria, and paralyze many people with fear.  As in 
the case with Beslan, a linkage between taking over a school is clear from both a societal 
and terrorist perspective as society perceives a school as offering a sense of security and 
safety.  Therefore, attacking a school exposes society’s fundamental vulnerability to 
terrorism.144  
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Peter Forster contends that the Beslan incident exposed significant failures in 
preventing terrorist situations through the mismanagement of intelligence.  Forster 
reasons that the initial failure in the Beslan incident occurred at the local level in the 
execution of an effective anti-terrorism strategy.  Prevention and protection requires a 
strategy based on deterrence and intelligence.  Perhaps most disturbing is the fact that 
local law enforcement had arrested a potential collaborator who had informed them of the 
possibility of school attacks, yet no local counter-measures were implemented.  
Shockingly, no police were deployed near the school nor did authorities consider 
canceling school or locking down the facility.145  The fact that many of the Ingush 
families living in Beslan also packed up and left three days before the attack also went 
unnoticed.146  The failure to recognize this mass departure as significant and the lack of 
action taken on the informant’s information suggests that the ability of Russian 
intelligence to communicate threats is lacking. 
The 62-hour ordeal began at 8:45 A.M. and the Russian Special Forces, or 
Spetsnaz, were activated at 10:00 A.M., arriving in waves between 1:00 P.M. and 3:00 
P.M.  Two divisions of forces were utilized, Alpha and Vympel.  These units are 
comparable to the United States 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment- Delta, which 
is an element of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).  The Russian Special 
Forces are unique, however, in that they are not specifically located within the army or 
navy, but throughout the country’s force ministries.  The Spetsnaz can also perform 
special operations outside of the traditional military or government units such as law 
enforcement functions on their own soil, whereas the provisions of the Posse Comitatus 
Act severely limits the use of US Special Forces.  If a similar incident were to occur in 
the United States, local law enforcement will be the first responding agency and it could 
take the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) hours to arrive. 
Prior to the Beslan incident, Alpha and Vympel had an excellent record of 
operations dealing with neutralizing terrorists and rescuing hostages.  Although often 
publicly criticized for the controversial methods used to mitigate the terrorist attack at the 
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Nord Ost Theater in north Moscow, they were actually highly successful in saving the 
lives of more than 700 people.  The news media leveled pejorative editorials at them for 
the use of nerve gas, which rendered the terrorists as well as the hostages unconscious.  
Unfortunately as a result, 129 hostages died from the effects of the gas, as there were not 
enough emergency medical personnel to treat the victims in a timely fashion.  They 
didn’t realize that the agent used in the theater had absorbed into the victim’s tissues, 
which caused many to stop breathing after initial emergency medical assistance had 
already been provided.147 Alpha and Vympel were not able to use gas at Beslan, as the 
terrorists were equipped with gas masks. 
Notwithstanding the extensive use of explosives and booby traps, coupled with 
the fact there were an estimated 35-50 terrorists to deal with, John Giduck argues that 
crowd control posed an extremely significant challenge as crowds proved to be the single 
biggest obstacle to the elite counter-terror teams establishing positions, developing an 
assault plan, and attempting to stabilize the situation sufficiently to even attempt a 
surprise attack.148 
While the Beslan incident ended tragically, there is much that can be learned.  
Giduck believes that it is a certainty that all useful conclusions drawn from Beslan- in the 
hope of preventing the deaths of children elsewhere in Russia and the wider world- will 
have to come from expert’s independent analysis and the application of those lessons to 
their own countries, security systems, and laws.149 
As a result of the attack in Beslan, Russian Special Forces were asked what the 
United States could do to protect its schools.  Members of the Russian Special Forces 
made the following recommendations: 
1. School security should be a large system, with the most important 
component being the information and intelligence system. 
2. School officials must take on a tactical mindset. 
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3. Extensive use of technology, especially surveillance and counter-
surveillance. 
4. The entire school compound should be fenced with iron doors at all exits, 
entrances and gates. 
5. Gates should be electronic and open by remote control. 
6. Every employee in a school should be trained to react to emergencies. 
7. Effective crowd control during an incident is critical to operations. 
It is important to note that these actions were not taken prior to the incident at 
Beslan, but are recommendations made as a result of the failures.  The Spetsnaz had two 
additional strongly recommended suggestions that are not likely to be accepted in the 
United States based upon our current culture and constitutional principles.  The first is the 
installation of “special neutralizing equipment” which is a delivery system for nerve gas 
as a preventative measure.  Their primary argument is that “if everyone is unconscious, 
fewer people will die, and the only reason to deny ourselves this tactic is our refusal to 
accept reality.”150 
The second equally controversial recommendation is to arrest the families and 
friends of the terrorists once their identities are known.  They advocate taking them out to 
the site and threatening them with execution if any children or hostages are killed.  Their 
belief is that this practice would serve as an effective deterrent to would be terrorists if 
they realize that their actions will in effect place their families in harm’s way.  They point 
out that this approach was successfully used in the mid 1990s when a Turkish passenger 
ship was taken and the Turkish Secret Service rounded up the families of the hijackers.  
As a result, the terrorists let all the hostages go free.151  It is clear that neither of these 
practices would ever be advocated or accepted in any democratic country, including the 
United States and therefore cannot be seriously considered. 
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In summary, there are important lessons that can be learned from previous 
Russian experience.  Some of these concepts could easily be implemented with the 
United States while the more controversial practices would clearly not be accepted. 
While using gas to render terrorists (and victims) unconscious or threatening family 
members of terrorists would not be acceptable in the United States, there are practices 
that are transferable to the United States.   
Urban area schools within the United States would benefit from a more robust 
security system with a strong emphasis on information and intelligence.  Moreover, the 
physical security infrastructure recommendations would be useful as well.  The United 
States has access to some of the most advanced technology in the world and should take 
advantage of available surveillance and counter-surveillance systems.  School 
administrators should take on a tactical mindset and all school employees should be 
trained in how to quickly and effectively react and respond during a terrorist attack or any 
other emergency situation.  Finally, school campuses should be treated as compounds and 
implement physical security measures such as perimeter fencing and fortified entrance 
doors with electronic locking/access mechanisms. 
2. Israel’s School Protection Practices 
Indisputably, Israel has experienced an abundance of terrorist attacks, including 
attacks on schools and school buses.  Michael Dorn quotes an Israeli police official as 
stating, “Israel does not claim to be the best at combating terrorism, but we are among the 
most experienced.”152  This statement is certainly well supported by the fact that between 
September 2000 and December 2005, Israel endured over 22,400 terror attacks causing 
7,250 casualties and over 1,000 deaths.  Over half of these deaths were caused by suicide 
bombings.153 Recorded attacks, beginning in 1968 through present day include several 
attacks on buses carrying children and suicide bombers at schools.  More than 50 adults 
and children have been killed and hundreds wounded.  Some attacks even took place 
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during field trips. Methods of attack vary from vehicle borne improvised explosive 
devices to suicide bomber vests.  Most recently, on June 14, 2007, Hamas’ military wing, 
the Izzidin al-Qassan Brigade fired rocket propelled grenades and mortars into the Rosary 
Sisters School in Gaza.154 
Dorn argues that the school-related attacks in Israel, Russia and other countries 
have implications for those responsible for school safety, plan development and 
emergency response in the United States.  A comparative analysis of these incidents can 
be useful in developing plans here in the United States.  Jeffrey Larsen and Tasha 
Pravecek believe that there are lessons from vast Israeli experience that might enhance 
homeland security efforts in the United States.155  Israel’s past and current experience has 
shaped the way in which they protect themselves, respond to, and recover from attacks.  
According to Dorn, Israel’s schools are “virtual fortresses, bristling with commandos, 
arms and checkpoints” although the actual situation is probably much less surreal.156   
As a result of two separate attacks where terrorists gunned down Israeli school 
children on field trips, armed guards now accompany children on field trips in the more 
exposed West Bank settlements, but not always in Israel proper (less risk).  The schools 
will contract with a private security company, which supplies an armed guard.  These 
guards are usually young and have recently completed their military service in a combat 
unit.  Some are field medics who can also render emergency medical care if necessary.  A 
less expensive solution is the school asking for parents with a license to carry a weapon 
to accompany the group with their weapon.  Every city/region employs a security officer 
that must approve field trips for schools with that area to insure that there will be enough 
armed guards or parents to provide an acceptable level of security.157 Buses are generally 
an attractive target due to the lack of physical protection; so many buses are also 
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equipped with bulletproof glass and sidings, especially in the West Bank to transport 
students from small settlements to other settlements to attend school.  Due to recent 
rocket attacks in Sderot, parent associations threatened to strike, contending that the 
students should be bused to another town to attend school to provide a safer environment.  
Sderot Mayor Eli Moyal disagreed, stating that transporting thousands of children to 
another town is “madness.”  As a result, the Ministry of Education has decided to enable 
the children of Sderot to study in safety by conducting all of the classes in the school’s 
bomb shelters.158  Additionally, in response to parents’ demands, the Ministry has 
decided to build more than 50 protected bus stops throughout Sderot as well as increase 
the number of buses to reduce commuting times.159  Moreover, as a result of the Ma’a lot 
school massacre, armed security guards are stationed at most schools. In 2003, civilian 
guards numbered 50,000 more than those employed by Israel’s three largest industrial 
corporations.  Among other things, they guard every school, college and university.160   
Israel and the United States share some of the same threats to their security 
including the global was on terror, state aggression by sovereign powers, weapons of 
mass destruction, and trans-border issues.161  The Israeli counterparts to the United States 
NORTHCOM are the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the Home Front Command 
(HFC), which is one of four IDF commands; however their mission is entirely domestic 
and does not involve protecting Israel’s borders.  The HFC also maintains the overall 
responsibility for law enforcement, fire, emergency medical services and the public 
health system.  In time of war, the HFC has command over these systems, whereas 
NORTHCOM does not.  There is no Israeli equivalent to the United States Department of 
Homeland Security, as comparable functions exist with the police, which is run by the 
Ministry for Public Security, and other government agencies under the responsibility of 
the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Commerce (for customs), and the Ministry of the 
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Interior (for immigration).162  Israel also employs the Mossad, which is the counterpart to 
the United State’s Central Intelligence Agency.  The Mossad, the Israeli Security Agency 
(Shin bet, Shabak), and the IDF Intelligence Branch (Aman) gather intelligence and 
launch covert counter-offensive operations.163 One of these groups could be among the 
first to receive critical information of impending plans to attack a school and may thwart 
the plans before put into motion.  
Israel maintains a special police school security unit that receives intelligence 
from the domestic security service.  When intelligence is received regarding a specific 
threat to a specific school, they take countermeasures including increased uniformed 
patrols and saturation with undercover plain-clothes police officers.  Additionally, the 
private security officers who are responsible for security at the school are trained on 
police guidelines and must comply with police rules and procedures.164 
In the United States, the guiding homeland security policies and operational plans 
are the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the National Response Plan (soon to be 
the National Response Framework) and the National Incident Management System.  In 
Israel, the civilian population follows the brochure In the Event of a Genuine Alert, 
Information on Civil Defense for the Family which provides specific instructions on what 
to do before, during and after an attack, either conventional or unconventional.165  The 
U.S. policies have a broad focus, which does not specifically address schools.  The Israeli 
directive actively involves the citizenry at large, and by extension involves schools.   
Perhaps the most impressive component of Israel’s homeland security efforts that 
can be incorporated into practice in the United States is its extremely high level of 
engagement with the civilian population.  Israel was the first and remains the only 
country to develop and implement measures to protect its entire civilian population 
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against a full-scale chemical attack.166  The civilian population is also provided with a 
government funded civilian protection program including warnings and sirens, a medical 
response kit (includes antibiotics and Atropine to be used in the event of a nerve gas 
attack), a protective kit (includes gas mask and filter), protected spaces, and specific 
instructions broadcast via radio and television. There is a distinct nexus between a 
prepared, involved citizenry and improved school security.  If the population as a whole 
is prepared, the preparedness will enhance school security. 
In Israel, education regarding response to terror attacks is provided to every 
citizen from elementary grades through high school.  Unfortunately, the United States 
appears incapable of adequately maintaining the most basic of programs including its 
failed Drug Awareness and Resistance Education (DARE) program due to local law 
enforcement agencies debating with schools about which agency is going to pay for the 
cost of the program.  In Israel, trained Homefront Command Soldiers visit schools to 
instruct children on how to protect themselves, and teachers receive training on how to 
prepare their students for attacks.167  Conversely, very little, if any training regarding 
terrorism is currently provided in schools in the United States. 
The federal government has developed a plethora of complicated and grandiose 
plans to deal with the terrorist threat and possible attacks within the continental United 
States but has utterly failed in the engagement and involvement of the citizenry at large.  
Interaction with the citizenry has fallen upon the shoulders of state, and mostly local 
public safety agencies, which receive little direction and inadequate funding from the 
federal government.  While the various grant programs such as the Urban Area Security 
Initiative (UASI) have been a windfall in terms of the purchase of equipment, they 
neglect to fund the most precious commodity- people.  People are the critical key to 
engaging and training the public to impart the concepts of self-sufficiency training and 
preparedness, as they have done so successfully in Israel. 
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There are several key Israeli homeland security concepts and practices that could 
be adopted in the United States.  Some may be more readily accepted or cost effective 
than others.  The following are those that may be readily accepted in the United States: 
1. Interagency Cooperation- Israel continually conducts realistic drills and 
scenarios with all agencies that will be involved in responding to an 
attack.  They also include schools in the planning process, exercise 
simulations and critiques. 
2. Public Education- A major education campaign complete with the 
distribution of necessary literature and safety/medical equipment to 
citizens. 
3. The use of advanced technology such as sensors and surveillance cameras. 
4. The use of barriers and fences to provide security and buffer zones. 
5. The National Police Force School Security Unit concept. 
The following practices would not be readily accepted in the United States due to 
various differences in size, culture, attitudes, previous experience, cost and governmental 
structure:  
1. Tight Internal Security- Metal detectors and armed guards at all public 
buildings, including schools, shopping malls, etc. 
2. Protected Spaces- Schools in Israel are required to have a room built of 
reinforced concrete with a blast door with protection against chemical or 
biological attacks.  This requirement is considered inadequate by some.  
Minister Tamir said on August 23, 2007 that a recent High Court ruling 
with regard to fortification of schools would make it impossible for the 
children to begin the school year on time.  The IDF Home Front 
Command instructed the Ministry to let the school year begin as 
scheduled, using the current “sheltered space” concept of protection.168 
                                                 
168 Ronen, “Tamir,” 1.  
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3. Profiling- The Israelis previously used a color-coding system with license 
plates to differentiate between those from the West Bank and Gaza.  The 
practice of profiling however is starting to secede as evidenced by the 
Israeli Airport Authority’s recent announcement that they will no longer 
be singling out Arabs for additional scrutiny.169 
4. In summary, Israel’s sordid history of dealing with a seemingly endless 
amount of terrorist attacks has resulted in the promulgation of one of the 
most robust homeland security practices in the world.  While some 
practices may be considered controversial or cost-prohibitive, many can be 
easily and effectively employed in the United States. 
3. School Protection in the United Kingdom 
Very little information exists regarding protecting schools from terrorist attacks in 
the United Kingdom.  It is likely a result of the fact that the U.K. has not experienced 
attacks on schools similar to Russia and Israel.  The author was able to locate one 
comprehensive document outlining suggested school security measures that take into 
account an “all hazards” approach versus a singular focus on terrorism.  The document 
School Security: Selecting the Measures is published by the South Yorkshire Police 
Community Safety Department.170 The document states that good security management 
is about being proactive rather than reactive and emphasis should be placed on prevention 
rather than detection.  The document goes into great detail, addressing areas such as: 
1. School security risk assessments. 
2. Establishing a risk management team. 
3. Establishing a safety risk management policy. 
                                                 
169 Nadav Morag (Professor, Naval Postgraduate School), e-mail communication, Monterey, CA, 
August 14, 2007. 
170 A. Foster “School Security: Selecting the Measures,”  (Sheffield, UK: South Yorkshire Police 
Community Safety Department.- n.d.)  
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4. External environment recommendations such as perimeter fencing, vehicle 
security and parking recommendations, defensive planting, one way 
systems, signage and security lighting. 
5. Closed Circuit Television Systems (CCTV is used extensively throughout 
the U.K.) 
6. Building shell recommendations including anti-scaling devices, doors with 
electronic locking mechanisms, use of a maximum thickness laminated 
glass in vulnerable areas. 
7. Intruder alarm systems, including remote signaling alarm systems that 
send a signal to the police. 
8. School office/reception access control, including use of identification 
badges and a single entrance point. 
Again, this is only an overview of the detailed recommendations within the 
document; however all of the recommendations appear to be reasonable in terms of cost 
and ease of implementation.  Many of these are similar to recommendations in various 
documents in circulation in the United States.   
4. Summary and Preliminary Recommendations 
While all three nations bear some similarity to the United States, the United 
Kingdom appears most similar when comparing the United States to the United 
Kingdom, Russia and Israel in terms of governmental structure, demographics and 
cultural norms.  It must be noted, however, that Britain does not have a federal system of 
government, it has a different type of school system and far fewer law enforcement 
agencies than the United States.  Russia and Israel clearly employ some aggressive 
measures possibly considered controversial or cost prohibitive to other nations; however 
these measures were most likely borne out of necessity, given the frequency and type of 
terror attacks respectively experienced by each. 
A summary of useful practices from the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation 
and Israel are highlighted in four categories as follows: 
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Intelligence and Information Sharing: 
1. School security should be a large system, with the most important 
component being the information and intelligence system. 
2. Extensive use of technology, especially surveillance and counter-
surveillance. 
Training and Education: 
1. Every employee in a school should be trained to react to emergencies. 
2. Interagency Cooperation- Israel continually conducts realistic drills and 
scenarios with all agencies that will be involved in responding to an 
attack.  They also include schools in the planning process, exercise 
simulations and critiques. 
3. Public Education- A major education campaign complete with the 
distribution of necessary literature and safety/medical equipment to 
citizens. 
4. Pre-emergency Planning/Operations/Response: 
5. School officials must take on a tactical mindset. 
6. Effective crowd control during an incident is critical to operations. 
7. The National Police Force School Security Unit concept. 
8. School security risk assessments. 
9. Establishing a risk management team. 
10. Establishing a safety risk management policy. 
Physical Security Measures/Infrastructure: 
1. The entire school compound should be fenced with iron doors at all exits, 
entrances and gates. 
2. Gates should be electronic and open by remote control. 
3. The use of advanced technology such as sensors and surveillance cameras. 
 88
4. The use of barriers and fences to provide security and buffer zones. 
5. External environment recommendations such as perimeter fencing, vehicle 
security and parking recommendations, defensive planting, one way 
systems, signage and security lighting. 
6. Closed Circuit Television Systems (CCTV is used extensively throughout 
the U.K.) 
7. Building shell recommendations including anti-scaling devices, doors with 
electronic locking mechanisms, use of a maximum thickness laminated 
glass in vulnerable areas. 
8. Intruder alarm systems, including remote signaling alarm systems that 
send a signal to the police. 
9. School office/reception access control, including use of identification 
badges and a single entrance point. 
B. CASE STUDY METRICS/METHODOLOGY  
In order to measure the relative preparedness level of the three school districts 
selected for the case studies, the author developed a comprehensive set of metrics.  These 
metrics were developed based upon the available literature and its wide-ranging 
recommendations, and working with local public safety personnel and school safety 
experts.  Also incorporated were recommendations made at various school safety 
conferences and school safety planning courses.  What resulted was a document designed 
to gather demographic information and to measure each district’s level of preparedness 







1. Prevention and deterrence 
This measures the district’s overall ability to prevent and deter an attack. 
a. Risk and vulnerability 
Has the district conducted a formal risk and vulnerability 
assessment involving local public safety personnel to assist in 
developing the emergency plan? 
b. School resource officers (SRO’s) 
Does the district employ full-time School Resource Officers and 
are they assigned to each building? 
c. Security 
Has the district employed the use of security measures such as 
surveillance cameras, magnetometers, and biowatch sensors?  Do 
they utilize a card access system with 100 percent identification 
checks and have supervised points of entry for visitors? 
d. Intelligence 
Does the district restrict public access to school plans and perform 
background checks on staff and contractors? 
2. Preparedness 
This measures the district’s overall level of preparedness. 
a. Planning 
Has the district developed a written emergency plan for the entire 
district as well as each individual campus?  Was the plan 
developed in collaboration with local response agencies?  Is the 
plan reviewed and updated annually and maintained in multiple 
locations on and off campus?  Have intergovernmental agreements 




Have critical incident response teams been established with written 
job descriptions and alternate personnel assigned for all positions? 
c. Equipment 
Does the school have the necessary equipment and supplies to deal 
with an emergency, especially one of long duration?  Does the 
school maintain a backup emergency power supply?  Does the 
school have multiple methods of electronic communication? 
d. Training 
Has all staff been trained on the emergency plan?  Is there an 
annual review of the emergency plan?  Is key staff formally trained 
on how to use the incident command system in an emergency?   
e. Exercises 
Are tabletop and full scale exercises conducted annually with the 
involvement of public safety personnel?  Do these exercises 
include law enforcement drills, building evacuation drills, bus 
evacuation drills, reverse evacuation and shelter in place drills?  
Are student accountability systems tested in concert with the 
drills? 
3. Response 
This examines the ability to effectively respond to potential as well as 
specific threats. 
a. Potential threat 
Are action plans in place to implement specific measures when the 
DHS threat level advisory system changes?  Are there plans in 
place to deal with important dates or reports of other school 
violence or attacks? 
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b. Event specific 
Are there event specific plans to deal with events such as a bomb 
threat, fire, intruder, active shooter, explosion, structural collapse, 
loss of power, chemical release, biological release, public health 
emergencies and radiological emergencies? 
c. Functional procedures in place 
Are there functional procedures in place such as hard lockdown, 
soft lockdown, building evacuation, bus evacuation and shelter in 
place? 
d. Information and media management 
Is there a designated public information officer and pre-established 
public information statements?  Has there been prior coordination 
with the media? 
e. Student accountability 
Has a student accountability system been established considering 
transportation plans, relocation and alternate relocation sites? 
4. Recovery 
This measures the level of plans in place to facilitate psychological 
recovery and a return to normal operations. 
a. Mental health preparedness 
Have crisis intervention teams, formal plans, and family 
reunification plans been established? 
b. Continuity of operations 
Does a formal plan to continue education in the event of a 
prolonged closure exist?  Have intergovernmental agreements been 
established with other school districts to share resources if 
necessary? 
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The case study methodology involved working with the persons responsible for 
safety and security in their respective school districts to complete the set of metrics and 
conducting interviews.  The preparedness metrics are included as Appendix A in this 
document.  The results are included in a narrative format within each case study section. 
Interviews were conducted with the head administrators responsible for safety and 
security in each of the respective school districts.  In addition to in-depth discussion 
regarding the preparedness metrics, each person was asked interview questions to 
determine: 
1. Strengths of the emergency plan. 
2. Weaknesses of the emergency plan. 
3. Desired plan components or resources. 
4. Budget or staff cuts that have negatively affected the emergency plan. 
5. The administrator’s view of the depth, breadth and quality of the 
emergency plan. 
6. The administrator’s view of the single most important thing a school 
can do to insure the safety and security of faculty, staff and students. 
C. FAIRFAX COUNTY, VIRGINIA SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Fairfax County Public Schools (FCPS) system is located in Virginia and is the 
nation’s 13th largest school system, serving a student population of 165,000 with 247 
campuses.  FCPS maintains a faculty and staff of 22,000 and has an annual budget of 
$2.4 billion.  Of the $2.4 billion, FCPS allocates $4 million to the office of Safety and 
Security.  An additional $9 million is allocated to 150 school staff with safety and 
security responsibilities.  This figure does not include the cost of School Resource 
Officers (SRO’s), which are funded by the jurisdictional law enforcement agency,  
which assigns a full-time SRO to each building. 
FCPS takes significant measures to insure the safety of all students and staff. 
Representatives from FCPS actively participate on Fairfax County local emergency 
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planning committees and emergency management teams.  These groups are responsible 
for planning the community’s response to potential threats. The FCPS plans have been 
referenced by the U.S. Department of Education, the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, and the American Prepared Campaign as national models. 
The school district and all FCPS school campuses have comprehensive safety and 
security plans. The plans were designed through a multi-disciplinary collaborative 
approach with the involvement of school security staff members, as well as local law 
enforcement, fire, EMS, emergency management, and public health officials. Plans are 
reviewed and updated regularly. These plans include procedures to respond to a plethora 
of critical incidents, school personnel practice these drills regularly.  FCPS not only 
involves other response agencies in planning efforts, but also provides its own staff to the 
Fairfax County Emergency Operations Center when the DHS threat level advisory 
system reaches the Red level. 
The author interviewed Fred Ellis, the Director of FCPS Safety and Security.  
FCPS successfully meets the vast majority of the benchmarks listed in the preparedness 
metrics.  The completed document is included as Appendix B.  In the prevention and 
deterrence component, FCPS does not employ explosive or biowatch sensors due to cost 
and the newness and reliability of the technology.  In the preparedness component, FCPS 
does not have pre-established agreements with local vendors, but is in the process of 
drafting an agreement that identifies them as a “priority client” in the event of a disaster.   
FCPS does not currently include student and staff photos in the administrator 
response kit, but is investigating doing so in a digital format so that the information can 
be easily updated and is readily accessible.  FCPS does not maintain food and water to 
self-sustain for 72 hours.  Their rationale is that there is a ready supply through the food 
services operation and they cannot imagine a scenario where additional supplies would 
need to be maintaining at every campus.  They have no plans to change the status quo in 
this regard.  While all staff is trained in the emergency operating plan and receives annual 
refreshers, not all staff is trained in CPR, First Aid and Automated External Defibrillator 
(AED) use.   
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In the response component, FCPS has not established a formal information plan 
with the media, but maintains a close relationship through the Office of Community 
Relations.  In the recovery component, FCPS does not have an established family 
reunification plan, but recognizes that this is very important and are working on a formal 
plan.  FCPS has a continuity of operations plan for long term school closures by utilizing 
local television as well as the internet through an on line educational platform called 
Blackboard.  The FCPS school board is currently discussing plans for pandemic flu and 
how to keep the educational system up and running. 
An interview was conducted on January 10, 2008 with Fred Ellis, Director of 
Safety and Security.171  Mr. Ellis explained that there are two levels of plans.  There is 
the micro, which is individual school level, and the macro, which is the district wide plan.  
The strengths of the school level plan are that it is concise, directional, has key 
information and detailed response checklists.  The strengths of the district wide plan are 
organization, breadth, comprehensive, the leadership team, administrative support and the 
integration with the Fairfax County Emergency Operating Center. 
Conversely, Mr. Ellis stated that there are weaknesses of both plans.  He stated 
that the weaknesses of both the school and system wide plans is that neither is strictly 
consistent with ICS and NIMS terminology.  He argues that while ICS and NIMS are 
well suited for fire and law enforcement because they use it regularly, they don’t work 
well for school staff because it is not used regularly.  He believes that even with more 
training, it would still be difficult to be proficient at something that may be used once or 
twice in a career.  Another weakness specific to the system-wide plan is the staff of the 
leadership team.  The leadership team members are used to directing things, and not 
doing things.  In an emergency, the members of the leadership team are expected to 
handle specific tasks. 
FCPS has a goal to incorporate NIMS and ICS more effectively and train more 
often using the NIMS and ICS systems and would like to add more radio capacity for 
                                                 
171 Fred Ellis (Director of Safety and Security, Fairfax County Public Schools), personal 
communication, Fairfax, VA, January 10, 2008. 
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better communications.  Currently, none of the elementary schools have the ability to 
communicate with response agencies on a common frequency.  They have to wait for 
district wide staff to arrive with the necessary equipment.  Despite this fact, this year’s 
budget process is considering taking away communication devices (Blackberrys and 
cellular phones) from several school administrators.  Many of these administrators serve 
in critical roles on the leadership team, and hold key positions.  Without these devices, 
they would have no method of communicating in an emergency other than a land line. 
Mr. Ellis believes that the FCPS emergency plan rates as an eight or a nine on a 
ten scale, with ten being the best and asserts that the most critical thing that a school 
district can do is to have a comprehensive emergency plan and to practice it.  He firmly 
believes that regular training is critical. 
D. CHICAGO, ILLINOIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
Chicago Public Schools (CPS) serves a student population of 420,000 with 655 
campuses.  CPS maintains a faculty and staff of 44,000 and has an annual budget of $5 
billion.  Of the $5 billion, CPS allocates roughly 1.5 percent to the office of Safety and 
Security.  The author interviewed Andres Durbak, the Director of CPS Safety and 
Security.  CPS successfully meets many of the benchmarks listed in the preparedness 
metrics, but does not meet some key components.  The completed document is included 
as Appendix C.  In the prevention and deterrence component, CPS employs School 
Resource Officers (SRO’s), but does not have one assigned to every campus due to cost.  
CPS does not employ explosive or biowatch sensors due to cost and the newness and 
reliability of the technology.  CPS does not utilize a 100 percent identification 
requirement and does not employ a card access control system.  CPS has not completed a 
staff skills survey, which is a critical component in selecting staff to serve on crisis 
teams. 
In the preparedness component, CPS has individual school level plans, but does 
not have a district wide plan.  They are, however, currently in the process of developing 
one. CPS does not have pre-established agreements with local vendors, and is in not in 
the process of doing so.  CPS does not maintain student and staff photos in the 
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administrator response kit and does not maintain a separate source of food and water to 
self-sustain for seventy-two hours.  CPS does not maintain classroom status cards,  
which are helpful to response agencies during a lockdown to quickly notify them of the 
well being of everybody inside each classroom. 
Training and exercises are the areas that CPS needs the most improvement in.  
They have had key staff complete only one ICS related training class of the four 
suggested and very few staff are trained in CPR, First Aid or automated external 
defibrillator use.  While CPS conducts some exercises, many are not conducted and some 
are conducted sporadically at best. 
In the response component, CPS has not yet developed a plan to deal with a major 
public health emergency such as a pandemic.  They also do not have plans for bus 
rerouting and have not established alternate relocation sites.  In the recovery component, 
CPS has established a crisis intervention plan and created teams; however they do not 
have any formal continuity of operations plans and have not established 
intergovernmental agreements with other school districts and entities to assist them in 
times of crisis.  An interview was conducted on January 11, 2008 with Andres Durbak, 
the Director of Safety and Security for Chicago Public Schools.172 
Mr. Durbak believes that the CPS plan is strong in that at the individual school 
level, for the first time in five years; greater than 90 percent of the schools had completed 
the review and update of their emergency plan by the deadline of October 1st. A new 
training program designed for new principals has also resulted in good plan compliance 
with the provided emergency plan template.  Conversely, preparing and conducting drills 
has been a major weakness, even though they are required by state law (the Illinois 
School Safety Act). The individual schools need close supervision and the Office of 
Safety and Security does not have to staff to provide the required level of supervision. 
Fortunately, CPS was recently awarded a grant through the Department of 
Education that will be used to create and implement more training for staff and parent 
                                                 
172 Andres Durbak (Director of Safety and Security, Chicago Public Schools), personal 
communication, Chicago, IL, January 11, 2008. 
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groups.  Funding will also be used to develop web-based support materials.  However, 
CPS has experienced a 40 percent cut in security staff over the last five years alone.  
Another 5 percent cut is expected this budget year.  The Office of Safety and Security 
used to have a director, deputy director and an associate director.  Now the office just has 
the director position.  There is little administrative support.  Consequently, Mr. Durbak 
believes that the school level plans would rank an eight on a ten scale, but the district 
level plan, which is in the process of being developed, would rank a four. 
In Mr. Durbak’s opinion, the single most important thing a school can do to insure 
the safety and security of faculty, staff and students is restricting and controlling access to 
the buildings.  Controlling access can be accomplished through a set of strict procedures, 
which doesn’t cost anything.  He points out that oftentimes schools take shortcuts and 
violate these policies for reasons of convenience.  Accordingly, the Office of Safety and 
Security regularly sends out people to try and gain access to the buildings and then see if 
they are challenged by anybody once inside.  Mr. Durbak also argues that funding is also 
critically important, citing that there are too many unfunded mandates and the State of 
Illinois ranks 49th of the 50 states in funding for education, yet Illinois mandates practices 
and procedures through the School Safety Act.  
The America Prepared Campaign studied the specific terrorism preparedness in 
America’s largest 20 school districts including CPS.173 The 2004 America Prepared 
Campaign report was harshly critical of and gave CPS a failing grade at that time.  Since 
that time, CPS has made some significant progress in preparedness initiatives.  These 
new initiatives include: 
1. The installation of security video systems at schools with high incidence 
of violence. 
2. Provided the Chicago Police Department and Office of Emergency 
Management with access to CPS IP-based security camera systems. 
3. Provided an intranet platform for the SRO’s to improve reporting and 
facilitate information sharing. 
                                                 
173 Phinney, Preparedness in America’s Schools, 13.  
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4. Published a new edition of the CPS Emergency Management and Safe 
School Plan guides to be in compliance with the School Safety Act and 
NIMS. 
E. ILLINOIS SCHOOL DISTRICT 207 
 School District 207 is located in Cook County, Illinois, approximately 20 miles 
from downtown Chicago.  District 207 is comprised of three high schools: Maine East, 
Maine South and Maine West High Schools, encompassing a 36 square mile area and a 
population of 143,503 serving 7,000 students with a staff of 950.  District 207 has gone 
through several versions of an Emergency Management Plan (EMP), with the most 
current draft having been produced in 2007.  The EMP is comprised of four general 
areas: Introduction, functional procedures, incident specific response procedures, and 
appendices. 
 The functional procedures include specific guidelines for: 
1. Hard lockdown 
2. Soft lockdown 
3. Heightened security 
4. Evacuation 
5. Reverse evacuation 
6. Shelter-in-place 
The incident specific response procedures include: 
1. Bomb threat and bomb threat checklist 
2. Fire  
3. Intruder/hostage  
4. Structural failure 
5. Utility loss or failure 
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6. Severe weather 
7. Hazardous material release 
8. Pandemic flu 
9. Natural gas leak 
The appendices include an incident command structure, threat level advisory system, and 
emergency response team.  Also included are: campus evacuation procedures, tables 
highlighting emergency responses and incident specific responses. 
The author interviewed Dr. Rose Garlasco, the Assistant Principal of District 207 
Maine South High School.  District 207 successfully meets many of the benchmarks 
listed in the preparedness metrics, but does not meet some key components.  The 
completed document is included as Appendix D.  In the prevention and deterrence 
component, District 207 only meets seven of the ten security criterion. In the 
preparedness component, District 207 did not involve the local Emergency Management 
Agency (Maine Township EMA) or public health representatives in the planning process.  
They have not made the emergency plans available via the intranet to allow secure access 
by local public safety agencies.  Moreover, no intergovernmental agreements have been 
established to legally allow the sharing of this information.  They do not maintain a 
student transportation roster in the administrator response kit and therefore have no 
system of accountability for students in transit should an emergency occur on or off 
campus.  Much like Fairfax and Chicago, they do not maintain a separate supply of food 
and water to self sustain for 72 hours. 
The area of training and exercises is perhaps the most concerning.  The faculty 
and staff are not formally trained on the emergency plan and it is not reviewed annually.  
The staff is not trained in CPR, First Aid or automated external defibrillator use.  None of 
the staff have received formal NIMS or ICS training.  The tabletop drills and exercises 
are sporadic at best and some types of drills are non-existent.  For example, they do not 
conduct state mandated evacuation drills at the Maine South campus for fear that the 
students won’t return if allowed to leave the building.  In the response component, they 
fare better, meeting most of the criteria; however they do not have plans for bus rerouting 
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or radiological emergencies.  They are currently working on a student accountability 
system.  In the recovery component, they do not have formal family reunification plans 
established and do not have a continuity of operations plan. 
Notwithstanding these serious shortcomings, District 207 has, however, created a 
very innovative practice.  Staff from District 207 collaborated with staff from the Park 
Ridge Fire Department to establish a community-wide "Joint Community Resource and 
Recovery Team" program (JCRRT) for the communities of Park Ridge and Des Plaines. 
The intent of this program is to combine and integrate existing resources to respond to 
critical incidents that require counseling, debriefing and intervention by trained mental 
health professionals and clergy. Initially, the JCRRT concept focused on establishing an 
infrastructure and system to rapidly deploy the team to any school whose existing 
resources are insufficient to meet the demands of a critical incident. Now well 
established, the team has expanded its role to include response to any critical incident, 
crisis or disaster within Park Ridge and Des Plaines.  The mission of JCRRT is:  
"Providing mental health support services to Des Plaines and Park Ridge residents and 
responders in times of community crisis."  
The JCRRT is an all-volunteer team represented by many organizations 
throughout the community.  The organizational structure of JCRRT consists of two 
integrated components, the management team and first responders. The JCRRT has 
developed and implemented a comprehensive NIMS compliant operational plan and 
program.  The JCRRT is an asset to the communities it serves and is part of the City of 
Park Ridge and City of Des Plaines emergency plans. As an asset, the JCCRT does not 
self-deploy but rather is requested by an appropriate organization that is managing the 
incident. The JCRRT has not yet been formally activated for a critical incident, but has 
exercised the plan through tabletop exercises. There exists a plan to integrate a JCRRT 
activation and response into a large-scale disaster drill, which will be scheduled in 2008.  
An interview was conducted on January 11, 2008, with Dr. Rose Garlasco, 
Assistant Principal of Maine South High School and administrator of District 207.174 
                                                 
174 Dr. Rose Garlasco (Assistant Principal, High School District 207), personal communication, Park 
Ridge, IL, January 11, 2008. 
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Garlasco feels that the strengths of the emergency plan are that it is comprehensive but 
concise and is not a cumbersome operations manual.  Moreover, the same plan format is 
used at all three campuses, providing much needed consistency.  On the contrary, there is 
no line item training budget to provide emergency response education to faculty and staff.  
Additionally, evacuation drills are not conducted for fear of students not returning to 
class.  The faculty and staff are and has been a transient population which makes it 
extremely difficult to keep people current on emergency policies and procedures and 
there are no ongoing implementation and education strategies. The administrative section 
of the plan is very weak, and needs to be more thorough and include things like 
distribution and compliance statements, however Garlasco rate the plan as an eight on a 
ten point scale, as compared to previous district plans.  Garlasco feels the single most 
important thing a school can do the enhance safety and security is to practice regularly. 
F. STATE OF ILLINOIS SCHOOL SAFETY ACT 
There is utility is evaluating state-level school safety initiatives and legislation as 
they directly affect and have an impact on schools at the local level. The State of Illinois 
has been relatively active in the arena of crisis and contingency planning for schools.  
Public Act 094-0600 (105 ILCS 128) - the School Safety Drill Act was signed into law 
August 16, 2005.  Its purpose is to have public and private schools review their plans 
with first responders and to conduct school safety drills.175 The Act “establishes the 
minimum requirements and standards for schools to follow when conducting school 
safety drills and reviewing school emergency and crisis response plans and to encourage 
schools and first responders to work together for the safety of children.”176 The Act 
applies to all public and private educational facilities that provide elementary or 
secondary education students under the age of twenty-one.   Each school building is 
considered its own school, as opposed to the Act being applied district-wide.  A  
 
 
                                                 
175 ISBE, All Hazard Preparedness Guide for Illinois Schools. 
176 Ibid. 
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minimum of three evacuation drills, with the local fire department participating in one, 
are required annually.  Additionally, one school bus evacuation and one shelter-in-place 
drill are required annually.  
Unfortunately, the School Safety Drill Act falls short.  While the Act requires a 
specified number of evacuation drills conducted by school staff and witnessed by local 
fire department officials, it does not require any law enforcement drills.  Evacuation 
drills, shelter in place drills and bus evacuation drills are mandatory, but law enforcement 
drills, while recommended, are not.  A law enforcement drill may include vital exercises 
such as lockdown, reverse evacuation, bomb threats and hazardous material release. The 
City of Chicago Public Schools lobbied against the original mandatory law enforcement 
component of the act, and it was thus “lobbied out” due to the cost of running 600+ law 
enforcement drills annually.177   Millions of dollars are spent annually on fire protection 
and fire drills, yet no child has died in a school fire in  more than 25 years meanwhile, 
multiple children have been slaughtered in school shootings, yet law enforcement drills 
are not mandatory as part of the School Safety Act.178 
Title 29 part 1500, Joint Rules of the Office of the State Fire Marshal and the 
Illinois State Board of Education: School Emergency and Crisis Response Plans- 
effective August 18, 2006 establishes requirements for the annual review and updating of 
the protocols and procedures that is required in each school’s emergency and crisis 
response plan required by the aforementioned School Safety Drill Act.179  The Act 
requires that the annual review is documented in a report and signed by the school board 
or designee.  The report should summarize recommended changes and state that those 
changes will be developed and implemented during the academic year.  The report is also 
required to list the people and agencies involved in the review. The school board is 
required to send a copy of the report to each party that participated in the review and a 
copy is also sent to the regional superintendent of schools. 
                                                 
177 Randy Bravemen, (Instructor, School Security Training Program, Illinois State Board of 
Education), personal communication, Tinley Park, IL, November 15, 2007. 
178 Ron Ellis , (Project Director, School Security Training Program, Illinois State Board of Education), 
personal communication, Tinley Park, IL, November 15, 2007. 
179 ISBE, All Hazard Preparedness Guide for Illinois Schools.  
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The Illinois State Board of Education partnered with the Illinois Terrorism Task 
Force Public Information Committee to develop a “Multi-Hazard Emergency Planning 
Program for Illinois Schools.” The statewide school security training program is designed 
to increase the capacity of schools to plan for and manage critical incidents.  Two classes 
are being offered at no charge: “Forming Critical Incident Response Teams” and “Train-
the-Trainer- Multihazard Emergency Planning for Illinois Schools.”  The pilot program 
was offered in 14 school districts to help make 207 schools and nearly 84,000 students 
more secure and better prepared.180 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The utility of examining the school protection practices in selected schools in the 
United States as well as abroad is clear.  The smart practices as well as lessons learned 
gleaned from the analysis can be applied to enhance the safety and security of other 
schools.  Fairfax County Public Schools is a leader in school protection and many 
practices can be applied uniformly.  Much of their success can be attributed to specific 
budget allocation, formal planning processes, formal procedures, staff training and 
regular plan exercise. Chicago Public Schools have and still currently face many 
substantial challenges.  They have experienced significant budget cutbacks and the level 
of preparedness has suffered as a result.  They lack perhaps the most important element s 
of preparedness, which are staff training and regular exercise and evaluation programs.  
District 207 also faces considerable challenges.  District 207’s challenges can be 
addressed through strategic and specific recommendations for improvement.  These 
recommendations are included in the next chapter and are a function of the research 
synthesized with an analysis of the case studies and the author’s personal experiences in 
the field of homeland security. 
 
                                                 
180 Office of the Governor, State of Illinois, “Gov. Blagojevich Announces Training Sessions to Help 
Make Schools Safer for Students and Staff : School Security Pilot Program Conducts First Training 
Session” Governor Blagojevich Press Release (January 13, 2005) 
http://www.illinois.gov/pressreleases/PrintPressRelease.cfm?SubjectID=3&RecNum=3625 (accessed 
October 26, 2006).  
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. PLAN FOR DISTRICT 207  
Clearly, District 207 needs to make significant improvement in their emergency 
plan and in their overall preparedness level.  District 207 does not meet many of the 
criteria in the preparedness metrics, notwithstanding Dr. Garlasco’s opinion that the plan 
ranks as an eight on a scale of ten.  District 207 is not currently in compliance with the 
requirements of the Illinois School Safety Act.  Following are recommendations for 
improvement in the plan and the overall level of preparedness. 
District 207 should have key staff; faculty, administrators and the School 
Resource Officer assigned to each of the three campuses attend the “Multi-Hazard 
Emergency Planning Program for Illinois Schools.” This statewide school security 
training program is designed to increase the capacity of schools to plan for and manage 
critical incidents.  Two classes are offered at no charge: “Forming Critical Incident 
Response Teams” and “Train-the-Trainer- Multihazard Emergency Planning for Illinois 
Schools.”  If District 207 cannot provide time for the personnel listed above, then the 
SRO’s and a key administrator should attend the train-the-trainer program and deliver the 
education to the remainder of the key staff.  This program provides important information 
and an excellent framework from which to develop a comprehensive plan. 
District 207 does not have a comprehensive emergency and crisis response plan. 
While they have an established plan, it does not contain the following components that 
need to be incorporated into the existing plan: 
 1. A statement of purpose for the emergency and crisis response plan. 
 2. Mission and goals of the plan. 
3. Description of the school’s overall approach to emergency operations and 
statement about how and why the emergency plan will be implemented. 
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4. Description of each school, including student and staff population and any 
scheduled daily differences in population. 
5. Information on students or staff with disabilities or special needs, 
including the number, location, and persons assigned to assist them during 
drills or emergencies. 
6. Identify who will be responsible for making revisions to the emergency 
management plan and for disseminating to all agencies. 
7. A list of hazards and vulnerabilities that could affect the school and their 
impact. 
8. Clearly defined roles and responsibilities of emergency response team 
members. 
9. Identification of the individual (by title) that is responsible for briefing 
new employees on the emergency plan and their role and responsibilities. 
10. Identification of the individual (by title) that is responsible for scheduling 
and providing training to all students and staff in emergency response 
procedures. 
11. Inventory of emergency supplies and equipment including radios (and 
frequencies), cell phones, etc. 
12. The plan should contain detailed floor diagrams with utility shut off 
points, HVAC intakes and controls, hazardous materials storage, 
numbered door access, roof access doors, primary building evacuation 
routes, secondary building evacuation routes, disabled/handicapped 
evacuation routes, designated shelter-in-place locations, elevator locations, 
intercom system locations, and command post location. 
13. The plan should contain an aerial site map of the campus and surrounding 
area with designated parent-student reunification site(s), fire department 
command post, police department command post, designated off-campus 
student evacuation sites (Maine South has this), alternate off-campus 
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student evacuation sites, off-campus school command post, off-campus 
media staging area, off-campus parent staging area, and on-campus 
gathering points/safe sites. 
14. The plan should contain a detailed public information plan including pre-
established statements for use in notifying the media, parents, faculty and 
students about any emergency situation. 
15. The plan does not have an incident specific response procedure for 
radiological emergencies. 
16. All three District 207 campuses are in close proximity of O’Hare 
International Airport and should have plans to deal with a plane crash at or 
in proximity to the school campuses. 
17. The plan should contain family reunification procedures. 
18. The district should consider the use of classroom status cards and 
incorporate the procedure into the emergency plan. 
19. The plan should include a drop, cover and hold plan as a functional 
procedure. 
District 207 needs to establish a formal plan for continuation of education in the 
event of a prolonged school closure and establish intergovernmental agreements with 
other school districts or facilities to conduct classes.  District 207 should consider 
additional facility security measures such as the use of surveillance cameras with IP 
access capability that can be viewed off campus by public safety agencies.  A 100 percent 
identification requirement should be mandatory for all students and staff and a card 
access control system should be implemented.  A security system should be installed at 
each campus for after hours building monitoring and security. 
  All school staff should receive initial and annual refresher training on the 
emergency plan. The incident command team and the emergency response team members 
should complete incident command system training including NIMS IS-700, NIMS IS-
800, ICS100 and ICS 200.  Annual tabletop and full-scale exercises should be conducted 
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in cooperation with the local police and fire departments, the Maine Township 
Emergency Management Agency and representatives from Lutheran General Hospital.   
The Illinois School Safety Act requires three evacuation drills annually.  One of 
the three evacuation drills requires participation of the fire department.  Each school must 
contact the fire department no later than September 1st of each year in order to arrange for 
the participation of the department in the drill.  Each school must contact the fire 
department having jurisdiction no later than September 15th of each year to propose four 
dates within the month of October, during at least two different weeks of October on 
which the drill shall occur.  The fire department is responsible for documenting and 
certifying that the school evacuation drill was conducted.  The schools must conduct a 
minimum of one bus evacuation drill each year.  This drill must be accounted for in the 
curriculum of all public schools.  This curriculum shall include instruction in safe bus 
riding practices for all students.  Schools are also required to conduct one severe weather 
and shelter in place drill which can also address scenarios such as a release of hazardous 
materials. 
While law enforcement drills are not required by the School Safety Act, they are 
strongly encouraged.  Drills should be conducted in cooperation and coordination with 
the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction to address and prepare for incidents 
including reverse evacuation, lock-downs, active shooter scenarios, bomb threats, 
explosions, or chemical or biological attacks.  If a law enforcement drill is conducted, the 
appropriate law enforcement official shall certify that the law enforcement drill was 
conducted. 
B. TEMPLATE FOR A REGIONAL APPROACH  
While there are many available templates and best practices to utilize and draw 
upon, this research has revealed that a template by itself is wholly ineffective.  It is not 
the template, but rather the process in which a school district creates and implements an 
emergency plan that is the key to a high level of preparedness.  Certainly, school districts 
can utilize a template such as the federal Practical Information on Crisis Planning:  A 
Guide for Schools and Communities available through the Department of Education.  
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They can also use a state guide such as the ISBA/OSFM All Hazard Preparedness Guide 
for Illinois Schools available through the Illinois State Board of Education; however, the 
process in which they utilize the template is critical to success. 
What this research and analysis has demonstrated is that school districts must take 
advantage of, utilize and leverage the knowledge and resources available through local 
agencies such as law enforcement, fire, emergency medical services, emergency 
management, public health, and volunteer organizations.  These organizations have 
expertise in the field of emergency planning, management and response and should be 
included in the school’s emergency planning process at the onset.  The wealth and 
diversity of experience will result in a comprehensive and robust plan that factors in the 
concerns germane to each of the respective agencies that have a stake in school protection 
and emergency response.  
A plan by itself is worthless unless all stakeholders are trained on it and 
participate in an annual review and revision process.  Tabletop drills and full scale 
exercises with all stakeholders should be conducted annually.  States should pay 
particular attention to mandates regarding the minimum number and type of drills, such 
as those required by Illinois’ School Safety Act.  All school employees should be trained 
in CPR, First Aid and Automated External Defibrillator use.  All key staff, particularly 
those with incident command and response team responsibilities should be trained on 
incident command principles and should complete IS700- National Incident Management 
System- An Introduction; IS800- National Response Plan; ICS100 and ICS200.  
Funding effective safety and security measures and programs presents significant 
challenges, especially for cash-strapped schools located in impoverished areas.  There 
are, however, funding mechanisms outside of the normal funding streams that schools 
can apply for, however federal funding for homeland security has becoming increasingly 
risk-based.  The Department of Education and the Department of Homeland Security 
provide funding for emergency planning in schools.  Additionally, the No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001 provides that school districts applying for grants under the Safe 
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Schools and Drug Free Schools and Communities Program insure that they have a crisis 
management plan for responding to traumatic or violent incidents on school property.181 
On August 29, 2007, U.S. Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings announced 
the award of $27 million in federal grants to 91 school districts in 32 states to assist them 
in improving and exercise emergency response management plans.  In fact, since fiscal 
year 2003, DOE dispersed $130 million to 400 schools districts through this program.  
Spellings stated: 
Providing a safe learning environment for children is one of our most 
important duties as educators.  These grants will support that effort by 
helping more school districts strengthen their crisis planning and better 
coordinate with the entire community to ensure the safety of our schools 
and students. 
The Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) grant program 
provides funds for school districts to develop and support their emergency management 
plans. The program also enables school districts to develop improved plans that address 
all four phases of emergency management: Prevention, Preparedness, Response and 
Recovery. School districts must pledge to develop written plans that are coordinated with 
state Homeland Security plans, support the implementation of the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) and also prepare for a public health emergencies such as a 
pandemic.  Funds can also be utilized to train school personnel and students in 
emergency management, disseminate emergency management plans and reunification 
procedures to parents and guardians, provide coordination with local emergency response 
agencies, purchase equipment, and collaborate with organizations responsible for 
recovery issues, such as health and mental health agencies.  Some school districts in the 
State of Illinois have taken advantage of this grant program with Bloom Township High 
School District #206 in Chicago Heights, IL receiving $504,685, Winnebago County Unit 




                                                 
181 US, GAO, Emergency Management, 5.  
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School District #33 in West Chicago, IL receiving $98,983, Harlem School District in 
Machesney Park, IL receiving $247,450 and Chicago Public Schools District #299 in 
Chicago, IL receiving $927,370 in 2007. 182 
The Department of Education also provides funding to some school districts for 
emergency management planning through the Emergency Response and Crisis 
Management Program.    DHS also provides funding to schools for emergency planning 
through the State Homeland Security Program, Urban Areas Security Initiative, and 
Citizen Corps grants.183  Unfortunately, some DHS program guidance does not clearly 
identify school districts as entities to which state and local governments may disburse 
grant funds.  States receiving this funding may not know whether such funding can be 
allocated to school districts and may not have the opportunity to benefit from this 
funding.184 
 
                                                 
182 US DOE, “$27 Million in Readiness.”  
183 US, GAO, Emergency Management, 7. 
184 Ibid., 1.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A. PREPAREDNESS METRICS 
General Information 
Student enrollment   
Number of campuses   
Number of faculty and staff   
District annual budget   
Percent or amount of budget 
allocated to safety and security 
measures   
Grades serviced   
  
Prevention and Deterrence 
  Yes No Commentary 
Risk and Vulnerability       
Conducted a risk and vulnerability 
assessment       
Involved local public safety 
personnel       
Used a formal model       
Used assessment to develop 
emergency plan       
School Resource Officer(s)       
Full time SRO       
SRO assigned to each building       
Security       
Surveillance cameras       
Magnetometers       
Explosive sensors       
Biowatch sensors       
Security system       
100% identification requirement       
Card access control system       
Supervised points of entry for 
visitors       
Visitor accountability system       
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Internal security personnel (non-
SRO)       
Intelligence       
Restrict access to school plans-no 
public access       
Background checks performed on 
personnel       
Background checks performed on 
contractors       
Staff skills survey completed       
    
Preparedness 
  Yes No  Commentary 
Planning       
Written emergency plan- district 
wide       
Written emergency plan- each 
campus       
Developed with input from local 
public safety agencies: 
    
  
Police       
Fire       
Public Health       
Office of Emergency Management 
(or equivalent) 
    
  
Reviewed and updated annually       
Plan maintained in multiple 
locations       
Plan maintained on and off campus       
Plan issued to local public safety 
agencies       
Plan web accessible- for official use 
only       
Intergovernmental agreements 
established to allow legal sharing of 
information 
    
  
Pre-established agreements with 
local vendors to facilitate rapid 
acquisition of supplies and 
equipment 
    
  
Organization       
Critical Incident Response Teams       
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established 
Written job descriptions for all 
CIRT positions       
Alternate personnel assigned to 
each position       
Critical incident response kits for 
CIRT members prepared and staged 
    
  
Administrator response kit prepared 
with:       
Student transportation roster       
School and classroom attendance       
Emergency contact list       
Student and staff contact list       
Student and staff photos       
Aerial maps of school and campus        
Site plans and diagrams of school        
Door numbering system        
Parent contact list       
Equipment       
Food and water to self sustain for 
72 hours       
Radios or phones assigned to 
response team members 
    
  
Radio with public safety frequency       
Medical supplies        
Emergency power supply 
(generators)       
Annual supply and equipment 
inventory       
Classroom status cards       
Training       
All staff trained on emergency plan        
Annual review with all staff       
All teachers trained in CPR and 
First Aid       
All teachers trained in AED use       
CIRT members or other key staff 
trained in Incident Command 
System 
    
  
NIMS IS-700       
NIMS IS-800       
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ICS-100       
ICS-200       
Exercises       
Conduct tabletop drills       
Annually       
Include local public safety agencies       
Conduct full-scale exercises       
Annually       
Include local public safety agencies       
Conduct law enforcement drills       
Annually       
Conduct building evacuation drills       
Annually       
Conduct bus evacuation drills       
Annually       
Conduct reverse evacuation and 
shelter in place drills 
    
  
Annually       
Student accountability systems 
tested       
    
Response 
  Yes No  Commentary 
Potential Threat       
Action plans based on DHS threat 
level advisory system 
    
  
Action plans based on report of 
other school violence 
    
  
Heightened security plans for 
important dates (9-11, Columbine, 
etc) 
    
  
Event Specific Plans       
Bomb threat       
Fire       
Intruder       
Active shooter       
Explosion       
Structural failure       
Loss of power       
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Severe weather       
Chemical release       
Biological release       
Public health emergency (pandemic, 
etc)       
Natural gas leak       
Radiological emergencies       
Functional Procedures in Place       
Hard lockdown       
Soft lockdown       
Evacuation        
Primary and secondary evacuation 
routes       
Reverse evacuation       
Bus evacuation       
Bus rerouting       
Shelter in place       
Information and Media 
Management       
Designated PIO       
Pre-established public information 
statements       
Pre-established media site(s)       
Prior coordination of plan with 
media       
Student Accountability       
Established student accountability 
system       
Established transportation plan       
Established relocation site(s)       
Established alternate relocation 
site(s)       
    
Recovery 
  Yes No  Commentary 
Mental Health Preparedness       
Established Crisis Intervention 
Team       
Established Crisis Intervention Plan       
Family reunification plan 
established       
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Continuity of Operations       
Formal plan for continuation of 
education in the event of a 
prolonged school closure 
    
  
Established intergovernmental 
agreements with other school 
districts or facilities to conduct 
classes 
    
  
APPENDIX B.  FAIRFAX COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS PREPAREDNESS 
METRICS 
General Information 
Student enrollment Approx 165,000 
Number of campuses 247
Number of faculty and staff 22,000
District annual budget $2.4 Billion 
Percent or amount of budget allocated 
to safety and security measures 
My office budget = $4 million, plus school 
based staff (approx 150) estimated cost = $9 
million.  These figures do not count initiatives, 
such as door access technology implementation 
($2 million) and other upgrades.  Does not 
include cost of SRO's, paid for by the police. 
Grades serviced K-12 
  
Prevention and Deterrence 
  Yes No Commentary 
Risk and Vulnerability       
Conducted a risk and vulnerability 
assessment X     
Involved local public safety personnel X     
Used a formal model X   Developed in-house 
Used assessment to develop 
emergency plan X     
School Resource Officer(s)       
Full time SRO X     
SRO assigned to each building X   High and Middle schools 
Security       
Surveillance cameras X   
Only 9 schools have external 
systems 
Magnetometers X   Only HS's have handheld 
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Explosive sensors   X   
Biowatch sensors   X   
Security system X     
100% identification requirement X     
Card access control system X   
In Elementary and Middle 
schools 
Supervised points of entry for visitors X     
Visitor accountability system X     
Internal security personnel (non-SRO) X   At Middle and High schools 
Intelligence       
Restrict access to school plans-no 
public access X     
Background checks performed on 
personnel X     
Background checks performed on 
contractors X     
Staff skills survey completed X     
    
Preparedness 
  Yes No  Commentary 
Planning       
Written emergency plan- district wide X     
Written emergency plan- each campus X     
Developed with input from local 
public safety agencies: 
    
  
Police X     
Fire X     
Public Health X     
Office of Emergency Management (or 
equivalent) 
X   
  
Reviewed and updated annually X     
Plan maintained in multiple locations X     
Plan maintained on and off campus X     
Plan issued to local public safety 
agencies X     
Plan web accessible- for official use 
only X     
Intergovernmental agreements 
established to allow legal sharing of 
information 
X   
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Pre-established agreements with local 
vendors to facilitate rapid acquisition 
of supplies and equipment 
  X 
  
Organization       
Critical Incident Response Teams 
established X     
Written job descriptions for all CIRT 
positions X     
Alternate personnel assigned to each 
position X     
Critical incident response kits for 
CIRT members prepared and staged 
X   
  
Administrator response kit prepared 
with:       
Student transportation roster X     
School and classroom attendance X     
Emergency contact list X     
Student and staff contact list X     
Student and staff photos   X   
Aerial maps of school and campus  X     
Site plans and diagrams of school  X     
Door numbering system  X     
Parent contact list X     
Equipment       
Food and water to self sustain for 72 
hours   X   
Radios or phones assigned to response 
team members 
X   
  
Radio with public safety frequency X   At High and Middle Schools 
Medical supplies  X     
Emergency power supply (generators) X     
Annual supply and equipment 
inventory X     
Classroom status cards X     
Training       
All staff trained on emergency plan  X     
Annual review with all staff X     
All teachers trained in CPR and First 
Aid   X   
All teachers trained in AED use   X   
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CIRT members or other key staff 
trained in Incident Command System 
    
  
NIMS IS-700 
X   
All of these apply only to those 
staff involved in EOC 
operations 
NIMS IS-800 X     
ICS-100 X     
ICS-200 X     
Exercises       
Conduct tabletop drills X     
Annually X     
Include local public safety agencies X     
Conduct full-scale exercises X   Limited occasions 
Annually X     
Include local public safety agencies X     
Conduct law enforcement drills X   
The police train in our 
buildings regularly. 
Annually X     
Conduct building evacuation drills X     
Annually X   Monthly 
Conduct bus evacuation drills X     
Annually X     
Conduct reverse evacuation and 
shelter in place drills 
X   
  
Annually X     
Student accountability systems tested X     
    
Response 
  Yes No  Commentary 
Potential Threat       
Action plans based on DHS threat 
level advisory system 
X   
  
Action plans based on report of other 
school violence 
    
Not sure what this means 
Heightened security plans for 
important dates (9-11, Columbine, 
etc) 
X   We remind staff--extra 
vigilance 
Event Specific Plans       
Bomb threat X     
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Fire X     
Intruder X     
Active shooter X     
Explosion X     
Structural failure X     
Loss of power X     
Severe weather X     
Chemical release X     
Biological release X     
Public health emergency (pandemic, 
etc) X     
Natural gas leak X     
Radiological emergencies X     
Functional Procedures in Place       
Hard lockdown X     
Soft lockdown X     
Evacuation  X     
Primary and secondary evacuation 
routes X     
Reverse evacuation X     
Bus evacuation X     
Bus rerouting X     
Shelter in place X     
Information and Media Management       
Designated PIO X     
Pre-established public information 
statements X     
Pre-established media site(s) X     
Prior coordination of plan with media   X   
Student Accountability       
Established student accountability 
system X     
Established transportation plan X     
Established relocation site(s) X     
Established alternate relocation site(s) X     
    
Recovery 
  Yes No  Commentary 
Mental Health Preparedness       
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Established Crisis Intervention Team X     
Established Crisis Intervention Plan X     
Family reunification plan established   X Not a formal plan, per se 
Continuity of Operations       
Formal plan for continuation of 
education in the event of a prolonged 
school closure 
X   
  
Established intergovernmental 
agreements with other school districts 
or facilities to conduct classes 
  X 
  
 
 APPENDIX C.  CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS PREPAREDNESS 
METRICS 
General Information 
Student enrollment 420, 000 
Number of campuses 655 
Number of faculty and staff 44K 
District annual budget $5Bil 
Percent or amount of budget allocated 
to safety and security measures 1.50% 
Grades serviced PreK-12 
  
Prevention and Deterrence 
  Yes No Commentary 
Risk and Vulnerability       
Conducted a risk and vulnerability 
assessment x     
Involved local public safety personnel x     
Used a formal model x     
Used assessment to develop 
emergency plan x     
School Resource Officer(s)       
Full time SRO x   High Schools 
SRO assigned to each building   x   
Security       
Surveillance cameras x     
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Magnetometers x     
Explosive sensors   x   
Biowatch sensors   x   
Security system x     
100% identification requirement   x   
Card access control system   x   
Supervised points of entry for visitors x     
Visitor accountability system x   Infrequent 
Internal security personnel (non-SRO) x     
Intelligence       
Restrict access to school plans-no 
public access x     
Background checks performed on 
personnel x     
Background checks performed on 
contractors x     
Staff skills survey completed   x   
    
Preparedness 
  Yes No  Commentary 
Planning       
Written emergency plan- district wide   x In process 
Written emergency plan- each campus x     
Developed with input from local 
public safety agencies: 
    
  
Police x     
Fire x     
Public Health x     
Office of Emergency Management (or 
equivalent) 
x   
  
Reviewed and updated annually x     
Plan maintained in multiple locations x     
Plan maintained on and off campus x     
Plan issued to local public safety 
agencies x   Subset w/pertinent info. 
Plan web accessible- for official use 
only x     
Intergovernmental agreements 
established to allow legal sharing of 
information 
x   
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Pre-established agreements with local 
vendors to facilitate rapid acquisition 
of supplies and equipment 
  x 
  
Organization       
Critical Incident Response Teams 
established x     
Written job descriptions for all CIRT 
positions x     
Alternate personnel assigned to each 
position x     
Critical incident response kits for 
CIRT members prepared and staged 
x   
  
Administrator response kit prepared 
with:       
Student transportation roster x     
School and classroom attendance x     
Emergency contact list x     
Student and staff contact list x     
Student and staff photos   x   
Aerial maps of school and campus  x     
Site plans and diagrams of school  x     
Door numbering system  x   Most schools 
Parent contact list x     
Equipment       
Food and water to self sustain for 72 
hours   x 48 hrs 
Radios or phones assigned to response 
team members 
x   
  
Radio with public safety frequency x     
Medical supplies  x     
Emergency power supply (generators) x   Most schools 
Annual supply and equipment 
inventory       
Classroom status cards   x   
Training       
All staff trained on emergency plan    x Local 
Annual review with all staff   x Local 
All teachers trained in CPR and First 
Aid   x Some 
All teachers trained in AED use   x Some 
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CIRT members or other key staff 
trained in Incident Command System 
    
  
NIMS IS-700   x   
NIMS IS-800   x   
ICS-100 x   In process 
ICS-200       
Exercises       
Conduct tabletop drills   x Few 
Annually   x   
Include local public safety agencies   x   
Conduct full-scale exercises   x Few 
Annually   x   
Include local public safety agencies   x   
Conduct law enforcement drills x     
Annually x     
Conduct building evacuation drills x     
Annually   x 3/year 
Conduct bus evacuation drills x     
Annually x     
Conduct reverse evacuation and 
shelter in place drills 
x   
  
Annually x     
Student accountability systems tested   x   
    
Response 
  Yes No  Commentary 
Potential Threat       
Action plans based on DHS threat 
level advisory system 
x   
  
Action plans based on report of other 
school violence 
  x 
  
Heightened security plans for 
important dates (9-11, Columbine, 
etc) 
x   
  
Event Specific Plans       
Bomb threat x     
Fire x     
Intruder x     
Active shooter x     
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Explosion x     
Structural failure x     
Loss of power x     
Severe weather x     
Chemical release x     
Biological release x     
Public health emergency (pandemic, 
etc)   x   
Natural gas leak x     
Radiological emergencies x     
Functional Procedures in Place       
Hard lockdown x     
Soft lockdown x     
Evacuation  x     
Primary and secondary evacuation 
routes x     
Reverse evacuation x     
Bus evacuation x     
Bus rerouting   x   
Shelter in place x     
Information and Media Management       
Designated PIO x     
Pre-established public information 
statements x     
Pre-established media site(s) x     
Prior coordination of plan with media x     
Student Accountability       
Established student accountability 
system x     
Established transportation plan x     
Established relocation site(s) x     
Established alternate relocation site(s)   x   
    
Recovery 
  Yes No  Commentary 
Mental Health Preparedness       
Established Crisis Intervention Team x     
Established Crisis Intervention Plan x     
Family reunification plan established x     
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Continuity of Operations       
Formal plan for continuation of 
education in the event of a prolonged 
school closure 
  x 
In process 
Established intergovernmental 
agreements with other school districts 
or facilities to conduct classes 
  x 
  
 
APPENDIX D. DISTRICT 207 PREPAREDNESS METRICS 
General Information 
Student enrollment 7,000 
Number of campuses 3 
Number of faculty and staff 900 
District annual budget 121,098,741 
Percent or amount of budget allocated 
to safety and security measures No specific line item for safety and security 
Grades serviced Grades 9 through 12 
  
Prevention and Deterrence 
  Yes No Commentary 
Risk and Vulnerability       
Conducted a risk and vulnerability 
assessment X     
Involved local public safety personnel X     
Used a formal model X     
Used assessment to develop 
emergency plan X     
School Resource Officer(s)       
Full time SRO X     
SRO assigned to each building X     
Security       
Surveillance cameras   X   
Magnetometers   X   
Explosive sensors   X   
Biowatch sensors   X   
Security system   X   
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100% identification requirement   X   
Card access control system   X   
Supervised points of entry for visitors X     
Visitor accountability system X     
Internal security personnel (non-SRO) X   20 SAFETY MONITORS 
Intelligence       
Restrict access to school plans-no 
public access X     
Background checks performed on 
personnel X     
Background checks performed on 
contractors X     
Staff skills survey completed X     
    
Preparedness 
  Yes No  Commentary 
Planning       
Written emergency plan- district wide X     
Written emergency plan- each campus X     
Developed with input from local 
public safety agencies: 
    
  
Police X     
Fire X     
Public Health   X   
Office of Emergency Management (or 
equivalent) 
  X 
  
Reviewed and updated annually X     
Plan maintained in multiple locations X     
Plan maintained on and off campus X     
Plan issued to local public safety 
agencies X     
Plan web accessible- for official use 
only   X   
Intergovernmental agreements 
established to allow legal sharing of 
information 
  X 
  
Pre-established agreements with local 
vendors to facilitate rapid acquisition 
of supplies and equipment 
  X 
  
Organization       
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Critical Incident Response Teams 
established X     
Written job descriptions for all CIRT 
positions X     
Alternate personnel assigned to each 
position X     
Critical incident response kits for 
CIRT members prepared and staged 
X   
  
Administrator response kit prepared 
with:       
Student transportation roster   X   
School and classroom attendance X     
Emergency contact list X     
Student and staff contact list X     
Student and staff photos X     
Aerial maps of school and campus  X     
Site plans and diagrams of school  X     
Door numbering system  X     
Parent contact list X     
Equipment       
Food and water to self sustain for 72 
hours   X   
Radios or phones assigned to response 
team members 
X   
  
Radio with public safety frequency X     
Medical supplies  X     
Emergency power supply (generators) X     
Annual supply and equipment 
inventory X     
Classroom status cards   X   
Training       
All staff trained on emergency plan    X   
Annual review with all staff   X   
All teachers trained in CPR and First 
Aid   X   
All teachers trained in AED use   X   
CIRT members or other key staff 
trained in Incident Command System 
    
  
NIMS IS-700   X   
NIMS IS-800   X   
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ICS-100   X   
ICS-200   X   
Exercises       
Conduct tabletop drills X     
Annually   X   
Include local public safety agencies X     
Conduct full-scale exercises X     
Annually   X   
Include local public safety agencies X     
Conduct law enforcement drills X     
Annually   X   
Conduct building evacuation drills   X   
Annually   X   
Conduct bus evacuation drills X     
Annually X     
Conduct reverse evacuation and 
shelter in place drills 
  X 
  
Annually   X   
Student accountability systems tested   X Recently automated 
    
Response 
  Yes No  Commentary 
Potential Threat       
Action plans based on DHS threat 
level advisory system 
X   
  
Action plans based on report of other 
school violence 
X   
  
Heightened security plans for 
important dates (9-11, Columbine, 
etc) 
X   
  
Event Specific Plans       
Bomb threat X     
Fire X     
Intruder X     
Active shooter X     
Explosion X     
Structural failure X     
Loss of power X     
Severe weather X     
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Chemical release X     
Biological release X     
Public health emergency (pandemic, 
etc) X     
Natural gas leak X     
Radiological emergencies   X   
Functional Procedures in Place       
Hard lockdown X     
Soft lockdown X     
Evacuation  X     
Primary and secondary evacuation 
routes X     
Reverse evacuation X     
Bus evacuation X     
Bus rerouting   X   
Shelter in place X     
Information and Media Management       
Designated PIO X     
Pre-established public information 
statements X     
Pre-established media site(s) X     
Prior coordination of plan with media X     
Student Accountability       
Established student accountability 
system   X In process 
Established transportation plan X     
Established relocation site(s) X     
Established alternate relocation site(s) X     
    
Recovery 
  Yes No  Commentary 
Mental Health Preparedness       
Established Crisis Intervention Team X     
Established Crisis Intervention Plan X     
Family reunification plan established   X   
Continuity of Operations       
Formal plan for continuation of 
education in the event of a prolonged 
school closure 




agreements with other school districts 
or facilities to conduct classes 
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